Middle Eastern Economics and Politics: Co-Dependent or Independent? The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict by Nienkämper, Matthias





Faculty o f  Social Sciences 
Charles University Prague 
in attaining the academic degree
Master in International Economics and Political Science
Degree Dissertation
Prague 2007
Author: Matthias Nienkamper 
Advisor: Prof. PhDr. Milos Calda
Opponent: •£(icy&t-C.Za
Defense of Master Thesis: 2007 
Grade:
PROCLAMATION
I herewith certify that all work in this thesis is an original. I have written this thesis 
by my own efforts and given proper quotation when having used relevant sources.




3. Middle Eastern Realities..........................................................................................14
3.1. Middle Eastern Realities: State of Constant Conflict?................................ 16
4. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict...............................................................................19
4.1. The beginning of the Modem Middle East.................................................. 20
4.2. The Sykes Picot Agreement.......................................................................... 21
4.3. The Israeli-Palestinian Marriage...................................................................23
5. An Essential Definition: The State......................................................................... 26
5.1. The Palestine National Authority: State or Non-state actor?.....................29
6. The Emergence of Shadow States & Low Intensity Warfare................................33
6.1. PLO Finances...............................................................................................35
6.2. Corruption in the Palestinian Territories.................................................... 38
7. Maslow and the Hamas............................................................................................41
7.1 The failed Palestinian Social Contract..........................................................45
8. Media, Terrorism and the Work of Lobby Groups................................................ 49
8.1. Manufacturing Consent............................................................................... 50
8.2. Creating Images........................................................................................... 52
8.3. Terrorism...................................................................................................... 55
8.4. The History of Lobby Groups..................................................................... 59
8.5. Lobby T echniques....................................................................................... 62
8.6. Pro-Arab Lobby Groups..............................................................................64
8.7. Jewish American and Pro-Israeli Lobby Groups.......................................... 66
ii





Figure - Title Page
A -  The MiddleEast 9
B -  The Red Line Agreement 22
C -  Organization of the PLO 40
D -  Palestinian Refugees 76
iv
ABSTRACT
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has captured the attention of generations 
throughout the decades following World War II. What are the sources of this 
conflict? What are the reasons behind “La revanche de Dieu ”, especially in the Arab 
world? This thesis is providing the reader with an historical, social, and economical 
analysis of major determents that are often times neglected when addressing the 
modem Middle East. The aim is to give an understanding of what is a personal 
relationship to a region that will have an influential role in the future of international 
politics. The current U.S. administration is facing ever growing resentment in the 
Arab world; curing the roots and pressuring the influential factors that hinder the 
successful implementation of a peace process could change the perception of 
America amongst Arabs and Muslims around the world. A destabilized Middle East 
is of no benefit to the Western powers, both politically and economically. The 
economic benefits for both the Arab world and the West are of enormous magnitude, 
ignoring the potential of the Middle East is thus grossly negligent. This thesis is 
providing a condensed overview of the main obstacles facing the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and the modem Middle East.
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1 - PREDLUDE
“Did you want to kill him, Buck?”
“Well, I bet I did.”
“What did he do to you?”
“Him? He never done nothing to me.”
“Well, then, what did you want to kill him for?”
“Why, nothing -  only it’s on account of the feud.”
“What’s a feud?”
“Why, where was you raised? Don’t you know what a feud is?”
“Never heard of it before -  tell me about it.”
“Well,” says Buck, “a feud is this way: A man has a quarrel with another man, 
and kills him; then that other man’s brother kills him; then the other brothers, on both 
sides, goes for one another; then the cousins chip in — and by and by everybody’s 
killed off, and there ain’t no more feud. But it’s kind of slow, and takes a long time.” 
“Has this one been going on long, Buck?”
“Well, I should reckonl It started thirty years ago, or som’ers along there. 
There was trouble ‘bout something, and then a lawsuit to settle it; and the suit went 
agin one of the men, and so he up and shot the man that won the suit -  which he 
would naturally do, of course. Anybody would.”
“What was the trouble about, Buck? -  land?”
“I reckon maybe - 1 don’t know.”
“Well, who done the shooting? Was it a Grangerford or a Stepherdson?” 
“Laws, how do I know? It was so long ago.”
“Don’t anybody know?”
“Oh, yes, pa knows, I reckon, and some of the other old people; but they don’t 
know now what the row was about in the first place.”
Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn
Figure A
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2 - INTRODUCTION
How do you imagine people living on Mars? I admit this is not the all attention 
grabbing sentence I had in mind when beginning this thesis. I wanted to write 
something brilliant, something which would reveal wit, cognition, experience and 
well done research - to portray an evolution of the mind that one should expect from 
an additional two years at university. Yet all I come up with is: How do you imagine 
people living on Mars? The reason is simple, as university folk we naturally expect 
our commilitos -  “fellow students” and professors to be informed about current 
issues and for them to understand why an event evolved as it did. We believe what 
concerns us should consequently concern everyone. The truth is that many of us are 
caught up in our own fields of specialization. We only step out of our faculty and 
students from other fields of study have a hard time to comprehend what we are 
talking about. We step out of the university field, and many people will have an even 
harder time to figure out the nature of events, which’s comprehension is a basic 
necessity to us. This holds true for the modem Middle East. While some people were 
able to afford a vacation to Morocco or the Red Sea, many have only seen the 
Middle East on television. Thus our image is formed to a great extent on what is 
broadcasted, or better yet what is prepared for us. It may come close, admittedly a bit 
out of proportion, to imagining how people live on Mars.
I once read “the first casualty o f war is truth”. I came to think about that, and I 
find actual truth in that statement. However, renowned journalist John Pilger argues 
that journalism is the first casualty of war. Analyzing this thought even further, 
Pilger quotes novelist Zdenek Urbánek: “In one respect, we are more fortunate than 
you in the west. We believe nothing o f what we read in the newspapers and watch on 
television, nothing o f the official truth. Unlike you, we have learned to read between 
the lines, because real truth is always subversive.”1 Even though the quote was made 
in the Czechoslovakia of 1970, most of it holds up today, and it brings me back to 
my question about Mars. I have lived in the Middle East for a good ten years, and 
have known the region ever since I was four years old. When I came back to Europe,
1 Pilger, John. “The real first casualty of war” [Online] Available 
http://www.newstatesman.com/200604240013, January 15th, 2007
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children in school asked me if we rode on camels, or lived in tents. These may surely 
be the naïve images children have; but sadly many adults have not come much 
further in their imagination and formulation of an opinion about the Middle East. In 
addition to, they have to believe what the media tells them.
I started out this thesis with one central question to myself: What can I write 
about which would not only full-fill the academic requirements set forth by the 
university; but also: What will I write about that is not going to torture my reader, 
keep my motivation up, and will actually be of some kind of use. I suppose it is not 
far-fetched to say that the Middle East will continue to be in the limelight of 
international affairs. There are surely several reasons to be found to keep an eye on 
the region: it hosts an ancient culture which attracts thousands of tourists every year, 
foreign firms can target the desires of almost 200 million potential customers, the 
necessity to develop new industrial sites and service sectors will require foreign aid, 
modem state of the art trading hubs are being erected which facilitate international 
trade, and perhaps worth mentioning as well, is that the Middle East oil reserves 
account for roughly two-thirds of the world’s proven reserves. As a logic outcome I 
would say then: for anyone involved in the field of International Economics and 
Political Science there exists a necessity to have some fundamental knowledge about 
the Middle East!
I have structured this thesis in a way in which I hope it will serve the demands 
of a wider audience. I found it practical to start out with a general historical, cultural 
and social background of the region for those that have little or no familiarity with it. 
It comes back to the old saying “you must know the past to understand the present”. 
The essential aim of my thesis is then becoming to uncover the hidden and often 
times unaccounted for roots and realities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I want to 
provide an understanding for issues such as why the PLO has never functioned as a 
state; how the disillusion of the 1967 war and corruption within the PLO opened the 
doors for an organization such as Hamas. In understanding these roots, I find it of 
great importance to highlight some of the never addressed issues, such as 
psychological and social needs of any human being, but also exemplifying the 
particularities of the Middle Eastern culture. In addition, the critical observer has to 
have an understanding of how the media plays an influential role in direct policy 
making processes, especially in the United States. Lobby groups are a further
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influential factor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Highlighting the history and 
function of the lobby apparatus in the United States will shed additional light on the 
many hurdles to overcome when considering a serious peace initiative. It is thus my 
aim to highlight some of most hampering issues in attaining - or at least advancing - 
a peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In my home country we say: “Eine Sache nüchtern betrachten.'1'’ Literally it 
means “evaluating something with a sober mind”. In English we say “keeping things 
in perspective”. Which is how I try to approach issues personally, but moreover, it 
should also be the way in which one should approach the Middle East and the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. The region is marked by extremes: politically, socially, all of 
what one may experience when being there. It is easy to develop a degree of 
ambivalence, I personally have moments when I simply love it there, and those when 
I flat out hate it. This mood is often times palpable when it comes to international 
affairs. There are times when Middle Eastern countries are everyone’s darling; when 
we admire their culture, enjoy their touristy sites, their beaches as well as their 
friendly and welcoming people. And there are times when we look at them with rage, 
abominate their beliefs and customs, and their once so admired countries become the 
“breeding grounds of terror” and belong to an “axis of evil”. I think it is an aid not 
only to me, but also the reader, that I have personally seen the Middle East with 
many eyes, the good and the bad. I may have the right to claim that I know a little bit 
of its people, and may therefore propose possible solutions to the problems facing the 
region today, namely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, a major source in 
reasoning in this thesis comes from within. From my own experiences, from 
friendships that I have had ever since I was a child, from days when I played 
basketball with a Muslim Arab, two Israeli, and an Afro American all in one team, 
from the hours I have wasted at Israeli boarders on suspicion of aiding the Lebanese 
militia, and simply from the many years that the region has had an influence on me. I 
do not seek to paint a naive and false image, one that is unrightfully positive or 
negative, for that I have lived and experienced the Middle East too long. I merely 
seek to provide an understanding, and suggest some ideas that may ameliorate some 
of the problems apparent in the seemingly never ending conflict between Israelis and 
Palestinians.
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In addition to my own experiences and understanding, I of course had to refer 
to more recognized sources. I have about forty books in my shelve that cover the 
Middle East or deal with issues closely related to it. They range from well known 
journalists, economists, and historians whom can be found on either camp, either 
pro/anti Israeli, pro/anti Arab, and supporting their own ideal solutions.
In attaining a good historical overview of the Middle East, I read Robert Fisk’s 
The Great War for Civilization -  The Conquest o f the Middle East. Robert Fisk is a 
British journalist and correspondent for the British newspaper The Independent and 
is often seen as critical to the politics of the United States and Israel. I do believe 
however, that Fisk who has spent decades in the Middle East, and who was able to 
gain the trust of Osama bin Laden for three interviews, is simply a reliable source 
that does not draw an extreme pro or anti American picture. He merely keeps thinks 
in perspective. A further valuable account of modem Middle Eastern history, 
especially in regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, was Thomas Friedman’s 
From Beirut to Jerusalem. Friedman, a Jewish American journalist, was the New 
York Times correspondent in Lebanon and Israel during the Lebanese civil war and 
has been stationed in both Beirut and Jerusalem. Friedman is not easy to be 
categorized, while some argue that he is pro-Israeli, I would argue that he often times 
draws a realistic picture and is not afraid to leave out harsh realities when it comes to 
depicting the politics of Israel. In my analysis of the role of media, I considered 
several books written by American theorist, political activist and professor at M.I.T. 
Noam Chomsky. Chomsky is also often times criticized in his portrait of American 
and Israeli politics, and the role of media. Chomsky was also an influential aid in the 
work of Janice Terry which provided me with great insight into the role of lobby 
groups in the United States. These four authors were my main source of information. 
I did however have various other authors of Middle Eastern history and society to my 
disposal and made frequent use of them. A full list of sources is given in the 
bibliography, often times offering personal accounts of politicians that had a direct 
involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as Jimmy Carter’s Palestine -  
Peace Not Apartheid. Other sources of information came from the wide array of 
established internet portals of political actors, newspaper magazines, journals, data 
bases, as well as interviews held with experts on relevant fields.
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3 - MIDDLE EASTERN REALITIES
Before I came to Prague in 2005 to attend Charles University I was working 
for a German multi-national cooperation in Cairo in the field of financial controlling 
and management. As we were a member of the German-Arab Chamber of 
Commerce, one of my duties was to attend the numerous conferences the Chamber 
(we simply called it so) held on either: business developments in the MENA (Middle 
East and North Africa) region, inventions of new technologies in certain industrial 
sectors, or how one could enter the Iraqi market for example. For the most part these 
gatherings were not very entertaining, nor would I leave with some sort of 
enlightened feeling, as for on most occasions the best part would be having a decent 
lunch and perhaps making some sort of new and useful contacts with other firms as 
well as keeping old connections alive.
On one occasion however, it was a conference on the future of the Middle East, 
one speaker would catch my attention at last. What was original about him was that 
he was an Egyptian with no illusions about the future of the region; he had an honest 
approach and confronted the audience with realities rather than painting a rosy 
picture. One of the key points I can still recall was: “I f  the Middle Eastern countries 
want to maintain the same unemployment rate, while keeping the same birth rate, 
they will have to create 70 million new jobs by the year 2020.” I would later be 
reaffirmed by a report in the Economist which predicted “the Middle East will have 
to create another 77m jobs -  doubling the current number -  over the next 20 years to 
accommodate all the new workers, requiring an annual economic growth rate o f 6%, 
almost double the rate before the recent surge in oil prices.'1' 77 million new jobs! I 
have personally witnessed the situation in the Middle East, not only in Egypt, but 
also in various other countries that I have visited. There are sometimes entire 
graduate classes where only few find a job. To put it in perspective: Almost 500 
students are supposed to graduate from Charles University’s Faculty of Law this 
year. Applying the scenario of many Middle Eastern countries, perhaps out of these 
500, only 10 will find a job. What will happen to the rest? If they are lucky they may
2 El Feki, Shereen. “A pumped-up market” The Economist -  The World in 2006. Pg. 80
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find a job in another field, some may be able to depend on the mercy of their 
families, but the rest may not find anything at all.
It is a very simple example, yet it may illustrate the scenario of many Middle 
Eastern crisis areas, and it helps us to find an understanding why so many youths are 
deluded and why it is easy for fanatics to attract many of them. I can’t help but quote 
my own grandmother, who gave my mother the old fashioned advice to keep me 
busy by enrolling me in some sports club. She said: “Let him do sports, that way he 
will be o ff the streets and not come up with stupid ideas”. I suppose it is a little bit 
like that. I can only generalize here (surely there are always exceptions), but you give 
someone a job, a role, provide a secure environment, an opportunity, and a chance to 
build a life and a family, then I would doubt that this person has the time, nor the 
willingness to go out on the street and be some radical and fanatic. The reader may 
wonder why these issues matter so much in the Middle East. Questions such as: 
“Why do they have to turn radical?”, or “Why do they have long beards, and what is 
this revival o f Islam?”, and finally “Why do they burn American flags and blame the 
West for what goes on around them?”, could now come to mind. The answer lies 
within an understanding for the Middle Eastern culture and society. For this purpose 
I would like to quote from a speech that particularly impressed me, which was made 
by James Zogby, President of the Arab American Institute in the United States, at the 
Forum 2000 Conference here in Prague last October. Mr. Zogby was referring to 
questions reporters had asked him: “Why fundamentalism? Where does it come 
from?” he was asked. “And the point is, each circumstance is different. Look at Gaza 
for one moment because that’s where the space issue comes from since the peace 
process began. Since the peace process begun, youth unemployment in Gaza has 
risen to 80%. Youth unemployment in Gaza is 80%, which means that a young man 
in Gaza today, 35 years old, has never had a job. He has never had a prospect o f a 
job. Therefore he cannot marry. Therefore he cannot have children. Therefore in a 
traditional society, the source o f honor, which is continuing the line, is ended. And so 
out o f this despair, comes this perversion o f life. Not just religion. Perversion o f life. 
This cult o f death, which sees honor in death. Yes, they are killing Jews, innocent 
Jews, but they are also murdering themselves. Suicide, which every religion is 
opposed to, has become a source o f life and honor. That is sick. But we must deal 
with the reality. Now how do you end it? You radically transform the conditions o f
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daily life. You create hope in the future, you bring justice... And transforming reality 
gives hope, which will then change the other and make space for the other.”
In the first chapter of this thesis I will thus address what I referred to as 
“Middle Eastern Realities”. I would like to stress one important point, and make it 
very clear: I do not plan, nor will I write an in-depth report of the economic make-up 
of the Middle East; analyzing every aspect of the economies of Syria, Lebanon or 
Egypt; how they are set up and,-or how they function; how many citizens work in the 
service sector and how many in the agricultural; nor do I plan to apply any sort of 
formulas and finally entangle myself in complex approaches to solve the foes of the 
Middle East. In later chapters I then plan to give the reader an idea of why certain 
groups of people find themselves in the situation they are; what lead them to their 
current state of mind and their actions; what some of the past and current economical 
factors were and still are that influence this outcome; and in turn aid in painting a 
distorted picture many hold of the Middle East. As with any text, some readers will 
be familiar with a given topic, others not. In this respect I shall deal with several 
historical events in chapter four.
3.1. Middle Eastern Realities: State o f Constant Conflict?
There is not one day that passes in which I do not hear something new from 
the Middle East on television or the internet. The news is usually bad. “Suicide blasts 
kill 40 in Baghdad'' or “Palestinian militants attack school festival”. I have to admit, 
unless it is something of outrageous dimensions it goes in one ear and out the other 
within seconds. I, and presumably many others, have become used to such news 
from the Middle East - it is nothing uncommon any more to be exposed to suicide 
bombings, killings and murders on a daily basis. There aren’t any clashes around 
Charles Bridge, no suicide bombing on the Old Town Square, and no one has fired a 
rocket into the National Theatre recently. The question then is, why should we 
concern ourselves with something that goes on some 3,000 kilometers away? I know 
it sounds a bit declamatory (perhaps lofty is the better word, in German we say 
pathetisch) to be talking about the Middle East in such a way (the last thing I want to
3 Forum 2000 “Transcripts -  Interfaith Meeting” [Online] Available 
http://www.forum2000.cz/en/projects/interfaith-dialogue/2006/interfaith-meeting/transcripts
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do is raise sentiment) but it may be helpful to attain some background and familiarize 
us with some facts, in order to have a better comprehension of news next time.
The Middle East has been in turmoil ever since I can remember, and most 
likely, ever since anyone reading this thesis may remember. What we are facing in 
the Middle East today, is perhaps not so much of a “Clash o f Civilizations”, but what 
I would call a “Clash o f Two Economic Perspectives” which are creating one 
economic system -  a system which is ill. On the one hand we have western 
capitalism - in the form of large multi-national cooperations and a small number of 
local “families” and oligarchs which dominate and set the rules -  and on the other we 
have members of a society that has been failed, which tries to find an anchor by any 
means, which constitutes those that make up the “Economics o f Conflict” -  the class 
which ultimately revolts against the system. Before the terror attacks on the World 
Trade Center or the riots in the suburbs of Paris, we regarded terror primarily as a 
form of crime against individuals and their property - now it has become an 
instrument of fear and mainly protest. “The Islamists per se are not the main obstacle 
for democracy, but the western-supported and more or less secular authoritarian 
regimes in the Muslim world\ 4 What Olivier Roy (said to be the leading 
international expert on Islamism) argues, is that Islamism -  the erection of an Islamic 
state - leaves many Muslims cold, at least in their base. The roots of the problem 
being, that the very secular generation which is now in its fifties and sixties - a 
generation which never came to politics because of religion, was a generation which 
ultimately failed. This generation was crushed in the war of 1967, would then turned 
to the Palestinian movement which was their uniting beacon of hope (which turned 
out to be an organization of nothing else than regular thugs - an ordinary militia) and 
when this cause seemed to fail as well, many of this generation turned their back to 
politics, and the small elites ended up selling their countries to the west. In our 
western societies we now turn to secularism as the all solving answer. We wonder 
why there is such a strong connection to religion, why does it have to be about Islam 
against the West, against Christianity perhaps. Professor Tomáš Halik of Charles 
University, provided me with a very fitting observation: “Secularism that would like 
to remove everything that is religious from the public’s fear is itself becoming
4 Roy, Olivier. Der islamische Wee nach Westen -  Globalisierung. Bntwurzlung und Radikalisierung. Munich: 
Pantheon Verlag. 2006, pg. 16
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intolerant and dangerous to religion. Such a stance logically provokes and 
strengthens religious fundamentalism, fanaticism and extremism”5 In other words, 
solving the problem of tensions in the Middle East by riding ourselves from religion 
will not solve anything. The roots of the problem are not to be found in religion (at 
least in my eyes), the roots are the economic conditions set up by politics, and part of 
the solution is in setting up favorable conditions in which people can live.
An additional obstacle in solving this problem is to be found domestically, in 
the way in which we are approaching the mental and emotional parameters which are 
being set for us. We are to believe that most Muslims are radicals; that they are 
largely angry people and that we should be scared of them. This is at least the image 
which is often portrayed in the media. I remember for example taking the train from 
Düsseldorf airport back to my home town in Germany. The train conductor asked 
everyone for their ticket -  only some Arab-looking men were asked for their 
identification cards as well. What mattered were not the trivial procedures the train 
stuff conducted, it was the looks the Arab-looking men got from the other 
passengers. “What are you doing here?” “/  hope you are not some kind o f terrorist -  
are you?” These questions were written all over their faces, especially the older 
generation. I agree, additional security is surely not a wrong measure, but it can also 
create additional fear and suspicion. I suppose that there are many people amongst us 
who can point out someone of presumably Middle Eastern origin. The question is, 
who can tell the many why a person is supposed to be feared, and why is this person 
supposed to be different from us? I acknowledge the tone in which these lines are 
written. They sound emotional, and they sound as if I am trying to make us 
“ Westerners” feel bad about how we see Arabs. In a time which was not too long 
ago, the Czech Republic was not part of the “West” either. Once you crossed the 
German boarder you were in the “ Wild East” as it was called. The following sections 
of this thesis are pointed towards this misunderstanding, and a perception that is not 
always right. They are aimed at helping to find the roots of the problem, which in 
turn help in solving it.
5 Forum 2000. Transcripts -  Interfaith Meeting. [Online] Available 
http://www.forurn2000.cz/en/projects/interfaith-dialogue/2006/interfaith-meeting/transcripts
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4 - THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
“ What is Jerusalem worth? ” “Nothing...Everything! ”
It was a French crusader who questioned Jerusalem’s worth in the widely 
criticized movie “Kingdom o f Heaven”. After a strenuous battle, the worn out 
crusader confronts his adversary, the legendary Salah ed-Din6, to know: “What is 
Jerusalem worth?” And Salah ed-Din answers him: “Nothing” - then pauses for a 
moment - “Everything/” The question is ever significant. One may ask why these 
people (these people being the Israelis and Palestinians) are fighting over a small 
piece of land, for hundreds, for thousands of years. Anyone reasonable would say, 
there is no reason, it is just land -  dry land on top, it is nothing, so why all the fuss, 
all the fighting and killing? On the other hand it seems that this land must mean 
everything. Which is the reason we are still looking at the Middle East; are looking at 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and even though it is a bit cynical to say, nothing has 
really changed in this fight over land, only that the means to kill each other got more 
sophisticated.
In the coming sections I will confront the reader with my perception of issues 
that I think can aid in finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian, - and Israeli-Arab 
conflict at large. For me the trouble is to determine the starting point of this quest. In 
theory I could go back 4,000 years ago, when Abraham journeyed from Ur to 
Canaan, or when Moses led the Israelites’ exodus from Egypt. These events surely 
left a mark in history, but I doubt that they will lead us anywhere, at least in the 
context of this thesis. The land which is everything to so many has been under the 
control of different rulers ever since it existed. Judea, which was the home of Jews in 
ancient times, was once conquered by the Romans and renamed Palestine (the 
Romans tried to erase the Jewish connection to the land, and thus named it Syria 
Palaestina, while Jerusalem became Aelia Capitolina). As referred to in the opening 
paragraph, Palestine was later conquered and ruled by Turks, Kurds, and European
6 Salah ed-Din was a 12th century Kurdish Muslim general and warrior. Among other achievements, he called for 
and led a holy war to rid the Holy Land of Christians, and by doing so gave Muslims a common cause. He 
recaptured Jerusalem and provoked the Third Crusade. Salah ed-Din drew a Muslim buffer across the trade routes 
between Europe and the East.
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Crusaders until the Ottomans incorporated it into their empire in 1516. When did the 
Middle East of our modem times begin though?
4.1. The beginning o f the Modem Middle East
It is widely accepted that the modem Middle East began after World War I. 
The Ottoman Empire which had aligned itself with the Central Powers was defeated 
in the war, and ceased to exist in 1922 when it was dissolved. I would like to argue 
though that in addition to the break up of the Ottoman Empire; perhaps 1908 marked 
an equally important turning point in Middle Eastern history. A British lawyer and 
oil-entrepreneur named William d’Arcy was conducting oil drillings for a British 
consortium, already for a substantial amount of time and without success. A few days 
after his investors lost patience and had ordered him via telegram to stop his works, 
on “May 26th drillers managed to tap an oil field which would supply over a billion 
barrels until the end o f the 1970’s.”1 A few months later the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company was founded, which later became the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and 
which we all know as British Petroleum or simply BP today.
The interesting story behind the foundation of BP (the largest European oil 
company in terms of reserves -  if we leave out Russia’s Lukoil and Gazprom), is that 
its early days stood in close relationship with British politics. When Winston 
Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, he gave impetus to reform 
efforts and switch in fuel from coal to oil, a massive engineering task, which also 
depended on securing Mesopotamia's oil rights.” On June 17th he was even able to 
convince the British Parliament to become the main share holder of the Anglo- 
Persian Oil Company. Shortly after he signed a contract according to which the 
company would supply the Royal Navy with oil. Churchill was not only interested in 
the changeover of his fleet from coal to oil-powered ships, but also to increase and 
secure British interests in Persia and its oil, which he would wisely estimate to be of 
strategic importance in the future.
7 Seifert, Thomas., and Klaus Werner. Schwarzbuch Öl -  Eine Geschichte von Gier. Krieg. Macht und Geld. 
Vienna: Deuticke. 2005, pg. 35
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4.2. The Sykes-Picot Agreement
With the end of World War I and the consequent dismantling of the Ottoman 
Empire, France and Great Britain were to divide the Middle East -  and its prize - 
amongst themselves. Sir Mark Sykes (a British politician, officer, and diplomat) and 
Georges Picot (a French diplomat), had already negotiated an understanding in 
November 1915, which was signed in 1916 and became simply know as the Sykes- 
Picot agreement. “With the assent o f Russia, the agreement led to the dismemberment 
o f the Ottoman Empire...the division o f Turkish-held Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and 
Palestine into various French and British-administered areas.”8 In the 1920 San- 
Remo agreement - among other issues - the suspected oil reserves of Mesopotamia 
were affixed to be split between France and Great Britain. The agreement (the part 
which comprised the oil reserves) was not very popular in Washington to say the 
least, the U.S. press called it a “backslide into imperialism”9 What worried the 
Americans was that the Europeans seemed to keep the U.S. oil industry out of the 
Middle East. In a move that would at times follow in the future, the British gave in to 
the Americans and told them that they could participate in the search for oil. What 
followed was the emergence of Mr. Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian, or “Mr. Five Per 
Cent”10 and the infamous “Red Line Agreement5,11 (see Figure B, pg. 22)
8 BBC News. “The Sykes-Picot Agreement.” [Online] Available
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1681362.stm
9 Seifert, Thomas., and Klaus Werner. Schwarzbuch 01 -  Eine Geschichte von Gier. Krieg. Macht und Geld. 
Vienna: Deuticke. 2005, pg. 37
10 It is common practice in the Middle East, as well as in other parts o f the world o f course, that people which 
facilitate any kind o f business, be it government tenders or international projects for example, receive a small 
percentage to make sure that “things work out”.
11 As a consequence of the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq fell under British mandate. The Turkish 
Petroleum Company which was granted exclusive oil exploration rights to Iraq in 1925 became the focal point of a 
struggle over who was allowed to invest in it and who not. On October 15th oil shoot 15 meters over drilling 
derrick, the drilling point would later be called “Baba Gurgur” (Kurdish for “Father of Flames” - in Arabic Baba 
also means father)”. After years of haggling, an agreement was made on July 31,1928. The American consortium 
(Near East Development Company) was granted a combined 23.75 percent share, the same amount going each to 
Royal Dutch/Shell, Anglo-Persian, as well as the French (Compagnie Française Pétrole). The remaining five 
percent went to Gulbenkian. According to various sources, Gulbenkian took out a large map and put it on the 
table. With a thick red pen he then drew the boarders o f the former Ottoman Empire, within which the negotiating 
parties committed themselves in the future to exploit and convey together. All important oil fields of the Middle 
East lay within the “Red Line Agreement”, except those of Persia and Kuwait (where the British already 
commanded over concession rights).
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Figure B
Source: Mount Holyoke University
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4.3. The Israeli-Palestinian Marriage
“The Bible says that when the first blood was shed among His children, God
asked Cain, the slayer, ‘Where is Abel thy brother? ’ And he said, 7 know not. Am I
my brother’s keeper? And the Lord said, ‘What hast thou done? The voice o f thy
/ 0brother’s blood crieth unto me from the ground. And now are thou cursed..." 
Jimmy Carter started out his latest book “Palestine -  Peace not Apartheid” with this 
quote from the Bible. I admit it is an embellished way to portray a depressing 
profoundness -  that “the blood o f Abraham, God’s father o f the chosen, still flows in 
the veins o f Arab, Jew, and Christian, and too much o f it has been spilled in grasping 
for the inheritance o f the revered patriarch in the Middle East"13 - a profoundness 
which is essentially true.
When the British issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917, which promised to 
build a national home for the Jewish people (with respect for the rights of non-Jewish 
Palestinian), history took an unfavorable path in the Middle East. The Ottoman 
Empire, part of the Central Powers, was defeated and dissolved. After the war, the 
League of Nations confirmed the British mandate over Iraq and Palestine, and a 
French mandate over Syria and Lebanon. Transjordan was separated from the 
Palestine Mandate, and thus the land between the Jordan River and the 
Mediterranean became Palestine. Naturally the Arabs very much resented the idea of 
Jews coming in and taking their land which they had lived on for hundreds of years. 
In addition the Arabs felt betrayed by the British, who had promised them {them in 
the form of the Sharif of Mecca14) the creation of a large Pan-Arab state as a reward 
for helping fight the Ottoman Empire in the war. The Jews on the other hand, had 
been expelled from Judea - what is known as the diaspora15 - and had sought to come 
back to Israel throughout the centuries which was part of fulfilling an interpretation 
of biblical prophecies (aliya is the Hebrew word for immigration to the land of 
Israel). “Although exact data are not available, it is estimated that in 1880 there were
12 Jimmy Carter. Palestine -  Peace No Apartheid. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2006, pg. 19
13 IBID
14 The Sharif of Mecca was the traditional steward of the holy cities o f Mecca and Medina (both in Saudi Arabia).
15 The expulsion of Jewish people from Judea - 8th to 6th century BCE.
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only 30,000 Jews in Palestine, scattered among 600,000 Muslims and Christian 
Arabs. By 1930 their numbers had grown to more than 150,000.,,ie
The Arab population saw their land slowly being inhabited by an increasing 
number of Jewish migrants, and as a consequence revolted repeatedly (on occasions 
they were led by the Mufti17 of Jerusalem Mohammad Amin al-Husayni18) -  
especially during the mid 1930’s. The relations between Jews and Arabs hence 
deteriorated and lead to a feeling of hostility between the two groups. The Christians 
and Muslim Arabs that had lived in the same land since Roman times were never 
committed to establishing an independent state, the idea only evolved with an 
increasing number of Jewish immigrants which bought land and seemed to have the 
idea of establishing their own nation. The British actually tried to limit immigration, 
proposed several ideas such as the Peel Commission19 or the White Paper of 193920, 
but nothing worked out. According to official British data “the Arab population 
increased from 760,000 in 1931 to 1,237,000 in 1945...while the number o f Jews 
during the same period increased to 608,000, primarily because o f persecution in 
Europe,”21
In the aftermath of World War II and its horrors, the United Nations General 
Assembly issued Resolution 181 in 1947 which established two entities west of the 
Jordan River -  Israel and Palestine. Great Britain withdrew its forces in May 1948, 
and Israel declared itself an independent state and soon after recognized by the 
United States. A war broke out in which Arab troops from Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, 
Iraq and Transjordan united to attack Israel. The Israelis, which were fighting for 
their lives and nation, ended up causing serious damages to the uncoordinated Arab 
troops and the war ended in 1949 with an armistice agreement signed between Israel 
and the Arab countries. Israel accepted to divide Palestine (which meant 77 percent 
Israeli, and 23 percent Arab), East-Jerusalem and the West Bank fell under the
16 Jimmy Carter. Palestine -  Peace No Apartheid. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2006, pg. 65
17 A mufti is an Islamic scholar who is an interpreter or expounder o f Islamic law (sharia) and capable of issuing 
fataawa.
18A1-Husayni was a Palestinian Arab nationalist and an extreme anti-Semitist. In addition to his role as the Mufti 
o f Jerusalem, he fought against the establishment of a Jewish state and would collaborate with Nazi Germany for 
that cause.
19 The Peel Commission of 1937 came up with a proposal to create a small Jewish state, with an area of 1/5 of the 
total area of Palestine. Jerusalem would have remained under British control. Jewish leaders accepted the 
proposal, while the Arab leadership rejected the proposal.
20 The idea of Jews and Arabs sharing one government - strict quotas on Jewish immigration -  For this reason the 
idea of partitioning the Mandate was abandoned.
21 Jimmy Carter. Palestine -  Peace No Apartheid. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2006, pg. 66
24
control of Jordan, while Gaza was occupied by Egypt. The war started the major 
exodus of Palestinians which were either expelled from their homes or fled (about 
726,000 refugees). In addition, the continuous tension caused many Jews living in 
other Arab countries to flee to Israel.
“7 am certain the world will judge the Jewish state by how it will treat the 
Arabs.” Although Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s first president, made this statement 
many years ago, the issue is ever prevailing. But what is a state? As scholars of 
Political Science we are familiar with terms such as sovereignty, institutions and 
general clauses of international law, but I find it relevant to briefly discuss the notion 
of state, and what it constitutes. Once we know what a state is, we can then move 
forward and examine if the Palestinians ever had a state, or are now on the path of 
creating one.
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5 - AN ESSENTIAL DEFINITION: THE STATE
Christopher Pierson, and undoubtedly numerous others, argues that one 
“cannot understand modern politics without understanding what the state is and how 
the state operates and is c o n t r o l l e d That is an adequate definition, yet in the light 
of Middle Eastern countries it leaves out some important details. We often assume 
that whatever holds true for us has to universally hold true for everyone. This 
assessment may sound a bit confusing, thus a quick example to illustrate my thought 
behind it: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was not even a state until 1932 when Abd 
A1 Aziz A1 Saud (or simply Ibn Saud) united the people living in this area. Ninety 
percent of the population is ethnically Arab, but what we have to note as well is that 
Saudi Arabia was largely inhabited by nomads which lived in tribes. These tribal 
roots still influence politics and the Saudi society today. When I asked Dr. Kamel El- 
Menoufi of Cairo University, why there was not a more homogenous feeling among 
Middle Eastern countries, why they could not present themselves as more united 
front, he said: “One o f the problems o f the Middle East is the fierce competition 
among Arab States themselves. In addition, tribal issues still dominate the political 
landscape today. Often times the situation is similar to that before Islam. ”23 These 
essentials may help us to understand the small, yet defining differences that can 
sometimes arise when assessing Middle Eastern politics.
I would argue that it is a time-consuming venture to consider all Middle 
Eastern states and to evaluate if they fall under the criterion of a state or not. But, as I 
will have regions of focus, it is of essential importance to at least briefly identify the 
parameters of politics, and more importantly define the features a state (Pierson aided 
me once again in setting the stage). He argues that even though not all political 
processes are about the state, this still holds true for most of the contemporary world. 
The defining elements of politics include:
■ The formation and expression of groups or social identities, in competition 
with other groups and identities.
22 Pierson, Christopher. The Modem State. London: Routledge. 2004 pg. 10
23 Interview with Dr. Kamel EI-Menoufi, April 16th 2007, Cairo University Egypt
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■ A competitive struggle between individuals, groups of people or 
organizations for control of the state.
■ A competitive struggle between different states (systems of government) for 
power, influence and the world’s resources.
For as important as these elements may be, the concept of the state will play an 
even greater role in assessing the magnitude of politics and economics in the Middle 
East. I deem it of crucial importance, as one of my main points of focus (the 
Palestine National Authority) will illustrate the important interplay of economics and 
politics in building a stable Middle East, especially when we consider the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict and the plan to establish a Palestinian state.
Pierson writes that the state is a distinctively modem and western way of 
organizing political authority and the conduct of government. We could go as far as 
to argue that the state sets the boundaries of mankind. I look at the Middle East, and 
sometimes wonder what has happened since Thomas Hobbes wrote: “Whatsoever 
therefore is consequent to a time o f war, where every man is enemy to every 
man...wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and 
their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for  
industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture o f the 
earth... no society; and which is worst o f all, continual fear, and danger o f violent 
death; and the life o f man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”24 Would it be 
far-fetched to argue that life in some Middle Eastern regions still contains such 
characteristics?
The state, or the idea of it, is a single, unified source of authority in each area; 
drawing upon the loyalty of the population; in addition to it is well organized and is 
directed towards the interests of the whole society. I would once again like to refer to
• 25 • ♦Pierson, as he categorizes the defining elements (four) and associated features 
(seven) of the state:
(1) “ The state is a set o f organized governing institutions which are connected to
each other or have some cohesiveness, so that it makes sense to describe 
what they do in ‘unitary’ terms, as though these institutions were a single
24 Ebenstein, William and Alan 0 . Ebenstein. Great Political Thinkers -  Plato to the Present. Orlando: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich. 1991, pg. 408
25 Pierson, Christopher. The Modem State. London: Routledge. 2004 pg. 14
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actor.” Pierson argues that states behave as a single actor only at some level, 
but that there are varying elements within the state that follow different goals. 
Thus ‘unitary’ accounts are always a shorthand description, capable of being 
filled out with a different, more detailed explanation.
(2) “A state must operate in a particular spatial area, where a substantial 
population lives as a distinct society.” Pierson emphasizes that there can not 
be a state in an empty territory, without a significant population, this 
population having common bonds such as culture, language and way of 
living.
(3) “The role o f state institutions must be to reach collectively binding decisions, 
and to ensure these decisions are obeyed.” If there are no institutions to make 
such decisions, and to then enforce them, then it is not a state.
(4) “The existence o f state institutions defines a ‘public’ sphere, a part o f social 
life that appears as distinct and different from the ‘private’ sphere o f  
individual or organized activity.” The public sphere includes not only strictly 
governmental activities but also those ‘political’ activities directed to 
influencing state institutions.
The less important but none the less strongly associated features include:
(5) “It must claim ‘sovereignty’ (that is, unconstrained power over all other 
social institutions) and control all the legitimate use o f force and coercion 
within its territory.” Sovereignty means that the state is the highest source of 
authority in the territory, the final locus of decisions, with no limits on its 
scope of internal control. The state must also be able to operate 
independently, free from external control. I would personally argue this to be 
one of the core features in defining a state.
(6) “The state must be able to define ‘citizens ’, those who are members o f the 
society, and also non-members; and it must be able to control entry and exit 
from its territory by citizens and others
(7) ‘To appear legitimate, any modern state must claim to be advancing the 
common interests o f its society or to be implementing some ‘general will’ o f  
its members.” This would infer strong ideological or ethical justification of its 
existence.
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(8) “The state must be accepted as legitimate by significant groups or elements in 
society.” Pierson notes that not every state will receive majority support, but 
any state that is not ephemeral must create substantial support bases 
somewhere in its society. “Modern states are organizationally distinctive in 
several ways. They are run by bureaucracies -  formal, hierarchical 
organizations where agencies are ‘budgetary units ’, financed from general 
taxation, which any state must be able to collect e ffec tive ly It is emphasized 
that the contrast with capitalist enterprises financed by sales and profits is one 
of the most important contemporary ways of identifying the scope of the 
state.
(9) “Modern states are also distinctive in the way they regulate social activities -  
using a legal apparatus to control civil society, and a constitution to control 
government agencies.”
(10) “A regime must be recognized as ‘a state’ by other states before it fully 
qualifies for ‘statehood’” Recognition as a sovereign power by other 
countries implies rights under international law which greatly help constitute 
a state -  such as non-interference by other countries in its internal affairs.
In having listed the elements and features of the state, and thus having set up a 
criterion which we can apply, I hope that we now have the essential tool to determine 
if governments fall into the category of state or non-state actor. As I had previously 
mentioned, having this tool will help us asses the actual condition a government is in, 
it will aid us in finding out what some governments are lacking, how some of these 
obstacles may be overcome, or how the international community can help in creating 
certain standards. In this respect I would like to asses one of the most crucial areas of 
the Middle East, the Palestinian territories, to give a quick historical overview and 
then see if we can apply the notion of a “state” or not.
5.1. The Palestine National Authority: State or Non-state Actor?
In the upcoming paragraphs I shall discuss the emergence of what I call 
“Shadow States”. The idea is to define which role the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) played within the Palestinian territories, how it would later fail
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most of the Palestinians, and by its own actions give reason for the eventual shift of 
power to the more radical Hamas. In the subsequent attempt to define such “Shadow 
States”, it may be of assistance to initially assess if the Palestine Authority ever fell 
within the definition of a state, or does so now (according to Pierson). Three dates, or 
better yet periods, will serve as focal points in this evaluation: 1964 -  1994, 1994 -  
2003, and finally 2003 -  present. To familiarize a reader unfamiliar with the topic, a 
quick and very general overview of events:
■ The PLO was initially founded in 1964 by the Arab League and its imminent 
goal was the destruction of the State of Israel. In its original charter the PLO 
called for self-determination for Palestinian Arabs, though at first the 
question of statehood was not raised (Only later would the PLO adopt the 
idea of an independent Palestine). There have been various proposals as to 
establish such a state - or two-state solution as we will soon see, but many of 
the Palestinian leaders would declare “their goal is still ‘liberation’ of all of 
Palestine”
■ In the infamous Six-Day War of 1967 (which nobody seems to remember if 
you ask any Arab), the Israeli army managed to overcome the armies of 
several Arab countries and then occupied the Golan Heights, Gaza, the Sinai, 
and the West Bank including Jerusalem. Six months later, the U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 242 (Annex A) was passed, confirming the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of land by force and calling for Israel’s 
withdrawal from the occupied territories (as well as a just solution to the 
refugee problem).
■ In 1973 Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in the Yom Kippur War and after 16 
days of fighting the U.N. passed Resolution 338 (Annex B). In 1974 at the 
Arab summit in Morocco, the PLO was proclaimed as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people. The Camp David Accords (Annex 
C) which were approved by both Egypt and Israel, confirmed Israel’s 
compliance with Resolution 242, withdrawal of political and military forces 
from the West Bank and Gaza, and full autonomy for Palestinians.
■ In 1987 a Palestinian intifada (uprising) erupted, and Israel responds to the 
violence with harsh retaliation. At the same time the militant Palestinian 
Hamas was established. In 1988 Jordan ceded its rights in the West Bank and
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East Jerusalem to the PLO. Yasser Arafat acknowledged Israel’s right to exist 
and renounced violence. The U.S. and PLO initiated dialogue.
■ In 1993 Yasser Arafat went further and recognized the State of Israel in an 
official letter to Prime Minister Rabin. In return Israel would recognize the 
PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In addition 
Israel and the PLO conclude a peace agreement in Oslo with mutual 
recognition and a five-year plan to resolve all remaining differences. Militant 
Palestinians and right-wing Israeli’s being attempts to undermine the 
agreement. The Oslo Accords granted the Palestinians the right to self- 
government on the Gaza Strip, and the city of Jericho in the West Bank 
through the creation of the Palestinian Authority.
■ In 1996 Yasser Arafat was elected president (in addition to Palestinians also 
elect the members of a legislative council). In Israel the Likud Party returned 
to power which stalls the Oslo process.
■ While Israeli forces withdrew from southern Lebanon after 22-year 
occupation in September 2000, peace negotiations at Camp David broke 
down. Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, and a second -  much more 
violent - intifada was launched.
■ In 2001 Ariel Sharon is elected Prime Minister of Israel, he rejected the Oslo 
peace agreement, and emphasized on national security. The Gaza airport 
runway, which was opened in 1998, is bulldozed.
■ In 2003 the Quartet Group (The United States, United Nations, European 
Union, and Russia) agreed on a “road map for peace.” Palestinians pledged 
full support, but Israel rejected key points. Violence continued, and the 
security barrier (started in 2002) in the West Bank drew international 
criticism for undermining the peace process. An unofficial peace agreement 
negotiated by Israelis and Palestinians is released with extensive international 
support as the Geneva Initiative.
■ Yasser Arafat died in 2004. Mahmoud Abbas was elected president of the 
Palestinian National Authority in 2005.
■ Palestinians elected a new government in January 2006 from which Hamas 
emerged as the winning party, securing a majority of parliamentary seats. 
Israel and the United States isolated Palestine, cutting off funds.
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■ Ehud Olmert became Israel’s new prime minister in 2006, promising that the 
dividing wall in effect be the new Israeli-West Bank boarder. Hamas and 
Hezbollah militants captured Israeli soldiers, and Israel forces attacked Gaza 
and Lebanon. Hezbollah missiles stroke northern Israel. U.N. Resolution 
1701 established a fragile cease-fire.
I admit that this overview may have been a bit lengthy, but it should help in 
defining the question of State or Non-State status now.
1964-1994
We can simply take the given time line and see that up till 1994, the PLO was 
by no means a state. It had no territory (criterion 2 under Pierson) The Oslo Accords 
granted the Palestinians the right to self-government on the Gaza Strip, and the city 
of Jericho in the West Bank through the creation of the Palestinian Authority. The 
PA even created a police and security force and managed to raise funds to finance 
itself from local taxation (also Palestinians abroad have to pay five percent of their 
income to the PA).
1994-2007
Once again we can flip back a few pages to see that the PA was not 
recognized as a state by most other states (criterion 9). The PA was clearly under 
domination by Israel - Israel incurred into Palestinian territories on numerous 
occasions and flew airborne strikes against police forces and citizens (criterion 5). 
In addition the PA was not able to control entry and exit from the territory 
(criterion 6).
As we can see, the PA never functioned as a recognized state. There are steps 
in the right direction, such as appointing a Prime Minister who leads the PA’s 
government independent of the State, or the election processes (despite its outcome). 
The PA is still far away from becoming a state however.
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6 - THE EMERGENCE OF SHADOW STATES & 
LOW INTENSITY WARFARE
After the United States and its allies won the war against the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, many - primarily Western - nations committed themselves to donate 
funds for reconstruction and development. It may be argued that all the international 
community can do, is to try to establish a somewhat “normal” functioning country of 
Afghanistan, but that it may be limited to only creating a security zone in and around 
Kabul. If we consider the re-emergence of the Taliban there may actually be some 
validity to this speculation. What is important to note within this context, for as it 
could stand model for many other nations in similar conditions, is that: “Twenty 
years o f civil war have created an economy ‘sui generis’, its future existence is 
incompatible with domestic peace and the integration o f the country in the regional 
and international economy.”26 Barnett R. Rubin further notes that: “This criminalized 
economy funds both the Taliban and their adversaries. It has transformed social 
relations and weakened states and legal economies throughout the region. 
Sustainable peace will require not just an end to fighting and a political agreement 
but a regional economic transformation that provides alternative forms o f livelihood 
and promotes accountability.”27 I personally like the “alternative forms of 
livelihood” part, which I will touch upon later however. The problem being, that 
Afghanistan is only one of many countries whose economy has been under long 
lasting influence from such “low-intensity” conflicts.
“Low Intensity Warfare” (also “Low Intensity Operations”) is a notion out of 
the military jargon. It refers to both a militarily and political strategy which is being 
used in so-called “Low Intensity Conflicts”, and can be defined as following: LIC 
(Low Intensity Conflict) is a confined political-military combat to achieve political, 
social, military, economic and psychological goals. LIC can often last throughout 
long periods and extents from diplomatic, economic and psychological pressure up to 
terrorism and uprisings. LIC is generally confined towards a certain geographical 
area, and is usually characterized by the limitation of military means, tactic and level




of violence. LIC includes the actual or considered use of military means up until the 
barrier of combat between regular armed forces (from: Low-Intensity Conflict, FC 
100-20, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth/Kansas; 
1986) There are other aspects of LIW (Low Intensity Warfare) which include: 
Counterinsurgency (preventing revolutions, civil wars and military conflicts), 
Counterterrorism (fighting terrorism) and Contra-operations (bringing about 
upheavals and downfalls). As we can see, the military aspect of LIW is only one 
element. “LIW is thus a political strategy with military components (not vice 
versa)7*”.
We could argue that LIC has almost superseded the traditional interstate war. 
The Swedish research institute SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute) has registered “57 major armed conflicts since the end o f the Cold War. 
Even though 2005 has had the lowest figure in the entire Post-Cold War period, 
there were still 17 major conflicts in 16 locations.”29 The violent conflicts we see in 
the Third World today are no novelty. The proxy wars of the Cold War era (with 
either American or Soviet supported camps) may be over, but Arthur Conolly’s 
“Great Game” is still being played out in some parts of the world. In my interview 
with him, Dr. Kamel El-Menoufi of Cairo University agreed that: “Beyond the 
obvious interest in securing Iraqi oil, the goal may not have been primarily in 
securing oil for the Americans alone (although surely to a large part), but to prevent 
the Iraqi market falling under the sphere o f influence by other countries which are 
either in competition with the West (such as China and India) - or have a hostile 
sentiment towards it (such as Iran) 30”. I may ask then: “Into what kind o f diffuse 
political and social structures are such countries, especially Middle Eastern, then 
falling? ” Religious and irrational antagonisms seem to be dominating while extreme 
hate has replaced any comprehendible interests (for example the Arab-Israeli 
conflict). Not only has this antagonism defined the Middle East, but I would also 
argue that a trend of violent lawlessness in such countries could easily swap over to 
our Western societies (only see the Paris riots of 2006). In this respect we are then
28 Heinzel, Sebastian and Dina Yanni. “Die Kriegsfiihrung niedriger Intensität -  Low Intensity Warfare -  als 
politisch-militärisches Konezept” [Online] Available 
http://evakreisky.at/2003-2004/staat-krieg/referat03_d.pdf
29 Harbom, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen. “Patterns of major armed conflicts, 1990-2005” SIPRI Yearbook 2006 
[Online] Available http://yearbook2006.sipri.org/chap2/app2A
30 Interview with Dr. Kamel El-Menoufi, April 16th 2007, Cairo University Egypt
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often confronted with so-called “Shadow States”. “The Israeli-Palestinian...conflicts
illustrate how shifting perceptions o f conflict—from decolonization and superpower
dominance to the current preoccupation with international terrorism—have
influenced international attitudes and engagement with these conflicts. Despite
continuity in the insurgent groups ’ ultimate objectives, the two cases also illustrate a
changing trajectory o f conflict owing to the particularities o f contemporary non-state
actor activity. While the Palestinian Authority continued to have problems in reining
in militant elements, Hamas’ ascent to power through municipal and later
parliamentary elections in Palestine cast the international community’s method o f
11
engaging with the conflict in a new light.”
6.1. PLO Finances
When Yasser Arafat was fighting for his life in 2004 (a battle he would loose 
later that same year), behind the scenes a major conflict came about: Not so much 
who would follow Abu Ammar’s role as a leader of the Palestinians, but who would 
inherit his fortunes. While U.S. Forbes magazine listed him as the ninth richest 
leader in the world with a personal fortune of $264 million, other sources (and I 
believe them to be more appropriate) such as Haaretz estimate his fortune to be 
standing at a proud total of $1.3 billion (the Scotsman went so far as to estimate at 
£2 billion). It may explain why his wife Suha re-emerged from the underground 
which had been the straining existence in Tunisia and the hardship of living in the 
finer arrondissements of Paris. It is said that she agreed not to demand an inheritance 
of her husbands fortunes (much of the assets of the PA and PLO were directly in 
Arafat’s name), but that she will instead receive $100,000 (Wikipedia) per month 
from the PA budget (the Scotsman says £100,000/month) as an allowance. What I 
find interesting about these assumptions, or perhaps facts, is that we can read about - 
and even see - many Palestinians struggling everyday for their minimum means of 
existence, while Mrs. Arafat goes about buying new shoes or a much needed 
handbag at Louis Vuitton on the Avenue des Champs-Elysees. The aim of this little 
interlude was meant to raise attention and be a bridge to my analyses of shadow
31 Holmqvist, Caroline. “Major armed conflicts” SIPRI Yearbook 2006 [Online] Available 
http:// yearbook2006.sipri.org/chap2
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states, and how they become to exist. Taking a figure such as Yasser Arafat for 
example, we may wonder how it is possible for someone to accumulate such an 
immense amount of wealth, which means were used, and why his own people saw so 
little of that money.
The “total assets o f the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) in the year 
1990 were an estimated $8 to $14 billion32,5 according to the CIA. If we were to take 
this figure as the gross national product, than the PLO’s GNP was higher than that of 
small Arab countries such as Jordan or Yemen. Furthermore, the PLO was 
considered "the richest of all terrorist organizations" with $8-$ 10 billion in assets and 
an annual income of $1.5-$2 billion from "donations, extortion, payoffs, illegal arms 
dealing, drug trafficking, money laundering, fraud, etc.", according to a 1993 
National Criminal Intelligence Service report. And finally, when a computer hacker 
broke the security code of the PLO’s computer system: “uncovering records o f about 
$8 billion the PLO held in numbered bank accounts in New York, Geneva, and 
Zurich...the newspaper also unearthed further secret holdings o f the PLO — 
including front companies, European real estate, and shares in Mercedes-Benz and 
the national airlines o f the Maldives and Guinea-Bissau -  in total about $50 billion 
for the year 2000 (up from $32 billion recorded in 1998). Naturally, Arafat and his 
men denied the report.”33
Naturally the question arises how is such a thing possible, how can an entity 
that is not even a real state, accumulate so much wealth? The answer lies very much 
within Arafat’s personal skills but also in the Middle Eastern political rules of 
conduct. Numerous Arab statesmen sympathized with the cause of the Palestinians, 
but did not want to make their own hands dirty, nor make their actions public (in 
order to keep active relations to the West). What they did was to donate money, and 
not a couple of hundred thousand but billions. A far more interesting aspect deserves 
more attention though: SAMED. The Arab acronym SAMED stands for “Sons of the 
Palestinian Martyrs” and can be regarded as the economic arm of the PLO. SAMED 
ran small factories and workshops (these workshops produced items such as shoes, 
blankets, tents, civilian clothing, uniforms, toys and furniture). “SAMED was 
originally established in 1970 to provide vocational training for the children o f
32 Livingstone, Neil C. and David Halevy. Inside the PLO. New York: William Morrow. 1990. Chp. 5
33 Ehrenfeld, Rachel. And a Thief, Too: Yasser Arafat takes what he likes. National Review. [Online] Available 
http://findarticles.cOm/p/articles/mi_ml282/is_14_54/ai_88990523
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Palestinian men and women killed in service to the Palestinian national cause. After 
1976 SAMED decided to accept any Palestinian needing employment i f  work were 
available. Most SAMED workshops were in the refugee camps in northern Lebanon 
and thus were not affected by the Israeli invasion o f south Lebanon in 1982”M In 
addition to supplying the PLO, SAMED would later expand its business and start 
exporting its products abroad (such as the Soviet Union). In 1981 SAMED employed 
over 5,000 full-time employees in Lebanon, 200 in Syria, and 1,800 in Africa. In 
addition, “there were over 6,000 part-time workers in Lebanon, and over 12,000
1C
persons would receive a professional education to establish their own company.”
“SAMED maintained 35 factories in Lebanon and numerous branches abroad.” “In 
the agricultural sector SAMED had poultry and dairy cattle farms, to provide the 
catering o f the Palestinian people. This sector alone earned about $16 million 
annually. In addition SAMED established joint-ventures in several African countries 
such as Sudan, Somalia and Uganda.”37 SAMED did not receive a set budget from 
the Organization, but when needed, it would receive interest free loans from the 
PLO. It is said at one point the PLO owned so many poultry farms that it could have 
supplied the poor of all Arabic states with eggs. The role of SAMED with the PLO 
was not a one-time phenomenon. There were plenty of other groups that were 
operated by similar means, either by legal or illegal means. In a non-biased statement 
I would assume that Middle Easterners can be found amongst the leading 
businessmen in the world. And for good reason; they do not shy away from forming 
uncommon alliances to attain a final goal. In January 1976, after calling in a 48 hour 
cease fire, a coup was conducted by Force 17 (joint commandos of Christian militia 
and Fatah, groups that usually fought each other) in which they robbed the British 
Bank of the Middle East. They managed to steal thousands of gold bars, millions of 
dollars in Lebanese and foreign currencies, as well as stock certificates and other 
valuables. “In the following months the PLO sold many o f the stocks and bonds 
found in the bank vault back to their original owners for 20 or 30 cents on the dollar. 
In many cases Arab governments and top officials were only too eager to buy back
34 The Library o f Congress, CIA World Factbook. “Jordan -  The Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization”. Photius. [Online]Available
http://www.photius.com/countries/jordan/govemment/jordan_govemment_the_palestinians_and~336.html
35 Adams, James. Geld und G ew alt- Wer finanziert den intemationalen Terror? Bergisch Gladbach: Luebbe 
Verlagsgruppe. 1990 pg. 123
36 IBID, pg. 121
37 IBID, pg. 122
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their assets since they had been illegally obtained in the first place, and disclosure o f 
the fact that they possessed such large sums o f money or owned companies doing 
business with their own governments would have been very embarrassing. So 
successful was the "fire sale" that in October 1976 a second shipment o f funds and 
other valuables, worth an estimated $250 million, were sent to S w i t z e r la n d The 
biggest problem the PLO had (or has) is corruption. And this truth is why many of 
the Palestinians lost faith in the PLO and Fatah (the political party within the PLO 
which is secular), and found new hope in a more radical group such as Hamas.
6.2. Corruption in the Palestinian Territories
According to definition by Pierson, one of the main characteristics of a state is 
having a constitution, sovereignty and a set of rules which everyone obeys. In such a 
situation citizens find themselves in a surrounding which is undemocratic, in which 
they are ruled by people who adhere to a strict chain of command as well as 
nepotism. The rules of the game are set out by whoever is on top. It is the reason why 
it was hard for the Hamas to breach the system (before the elections), as they had to 
shift the political and economic power. Thus the question who is in power is not 
always a given answer, as without constitution or sovereignty a shadow state such as 
the Palestine Authority is build on fragile pillars. Those on top of the economic and 
militarily ladder are able to defend their status by having extended privileges and 
access to large amounts of money. Therefore it is without surprise that corruption is a 
main characteristic of the shadow state, and one of its biggest hurdles to overcome in 
achieving the recognition as a sovereign state.
When I was living in the Middle East, one observation was always stunning 
me: You could go out of your house and look into your boab's (a sort of door and 
watchman) apartment (it was more of a room or garage in which the entire family 
lived), you could be on a street comer buying something to drink, you could literally 
be in the middle of nowhere, and you would always find a TV running somewhere. 
People have barely something to eat I wondered, but they have to have a TV. And 
even though I have not been to the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, I suppose it is no
38 Lebanese Forces. “Historical Fact: Arafat's Bank Robbery” [Online] Available 
http://www.lebaneseforces.co m/blastfromthepastOO 1 .asp
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different, and news travel fast. News which sounds similar to: “A secret 600-page 
report completed by the Palestinian Authority's auditing office last month found that 
$323-million—which is almost 40% o f the PA's annual budget—has been wasted or 
misused by PLO/PA officials, according to the Jerusalem Post.39” “The PLO has 
used at least $47-million in foreign donations to illegally purchase property in 
Jerusalem, to buy private apartments for PLO bureaucrats, and to finance covert 
political activities, according to internal correspondence between PLO chairman 
Yasser Arafat and officials o f the PLO's PECDAR agency, which handles donations 
from abroad (New York Times, June 30, 1995; Washington Times, Aug. 5, 1995).40” 
“An additional $13 million in foreign donations for Gaza and Jericho was diverted 
by the PLO for other purposes in Lebanon (Jerusalem Post, March 22, 1995).41” 
The list goes on and on, and I think the point is clear that there is a problem with 
corruption within the PLO.
An article in the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram noted the many Palestinian 
officials, activists and others, which were publicly condemning corruption, the state 
of chaos the territories were in and which were calling for reforms. After this 
observation, the ironic question being raised then, if so many voices within the 
Palestinian organization are calling out for reform: “who are the corrupt officials 
everyone is talking about then (A1 Ahram, July 29, 2004)42?” In various surveys 
which were conducted in the Palestinian territories, between 80 to 90 percent of the 
local population thought that there was corruption with the PLO. It would be a 
tedious task to find evidence of whom in the PLO was directly involved in 
corruption, it is nonetheless a fact that corruption exists with the organization. 
Reports of favoritism, nepotism and corruption in the leading circles of the PLO are 
so common however, that aside from betraying their own people, the PLO is setting 
stage for the emergence of hardliners such as Hamas. Is corruption the only answer 
available to understand the raise of Hamas? “Frankly, the Palestinian Authority, 
which is corrupt and cavorts with terror...is not the basis for a Palestinian state 
moving forward’’ (at that time - National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, in the 
San Jose Mercury News on June 15th, 2002).
39 Jerusalem Post May 25th , 1997
40 New York Times June 30th 1995
41 Jerusalem Post March 22nd 1995
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7 - MASLOW AND THE HAMAS
The Hamas or Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance 
Movement) has a two-sided image: in the West the organization is classified as a 
terror organization, while in Gaza it shines through its social commitments. The 
question is why? Why has an organization that “is best known outside the Palestinian 
territories for its suicide bombings and other attacks directed against Israeli 
civilians”; which still calls for the destruction of the State of Israel (written in its 
charter) and its replacement with a Palestinian Islamic state; which sees no other 
solution to the Palestinian question other than Jihad; why has it won the recent 
elections and now forms the majority party of the Palestinian National Authority? 
There are plenty of ways in which one can approach the question of explaining 
Hamas’ rise to power. In the following paragraphs I want to address the more 
psychological and social perspectives, before turning my attention to the role of 
media and lobby groups.
In a time that now seems long ago I first heard of Abraham Maslow. While 
earning a degree in Business Administration, I took a course titled “Behavior in 
Organization”, and it was then that my professor exposed me to Maslow and his 
“Hierarchy of Needs”. In trying to explain the Hamas it came to my mind that one of 
the possible explanations may be found in applying the theory that Maslow proposed 
in his paper A Theory o f Human Motivation. In brief, Maslow stated that humans 
primarily need to attain a set of basic needs in order to later reach additional needs 
that he had placed on a set hierarchy. The theory was published some sixty years ago, 
and even though it is widely criticized I do believe there is some validity to it. 
According to Maslow (Greenberg and Baron43), the first of five stages is the 
physiological stage in which humans need to satisfy basic needs such as water, food 
and sleep. The second stage is that of safety, and here Maslow includes needs such as 
security of job, body, resources, family, health, a future and property. The third stage 
is that of love and belonging which entails friendship and family. The fourth stage is 
that of esteem, here Maslow includes self-esteem, achievement, confidence, respect
43 Greenberg, Jerald and Robert A. Baron. Behavior in Organizations. Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall. 1997, 
pg. 145
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of others and respect by others. The final stage of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is the 
self-actualization stage. Here we find morality, creativity, problem solving, and 
acceptance of facts and lack of prejudice.
Maslow’s theory may explain my earlier quote of James Zogby quest in trying 
to find an answer to fundamentalism. In this attempt to explain the psychological and 
social perspective of Hamas’ and other fundamentalist’s success, I would like to refer 
to three articles which I found in Der Spiegel, tales which are all too common and 
which will serve as my real-life model; giving Zogby’s example an actual face. The 
reason why I picked these specific articles, is that they illustrate the daily life of 
Palestinians and Israelis: for one the different fractions in Palestinian society, those 
that have already turned to the fundamental Hamas, and those which still resemble a 
seed of hope, which give reason to believe that with the right measures conditions 
could improve; and secondly what has become daily life for many Israelis as well, a 
story which may help to understand the deep rift between the two fractions.
The first article44 tells the story of a widow and mother of seven. When Etidal’s 
(the woman’s name) husband got killed by Israeli helicopters, while flying an attack 
on the refugee camp of Jebalia in the North of Gaza-City, she became a welfare case 
and in addition a Hamas supporter overnight. The woman tells the reporters that her 
husband had actually been a supporter of the Fatah, and not of Hamas, but after his 
death the family would not have survived without the help of the Hamas. As her 
husband had officially become a martyr (a Palestinian killed by Israeli military), she 
was given the official pension of 100 Euros/three months. Considering that this 
amount is hardly enough to survive, Etidal states that the Hamas had hence adopted 
her children. She receives 15 Euros/month for every child as child allowance; in 
addition the children can visit the school of a Hamas organization for free. Despite 
the fact that the woman is illiterate, she managed to vote for the Islamic party which 
is presented on the ballots with a crescent as its symbol. In the articles conclusion 
Etidal speaks one last time of her support of Hamas and the future of her children: 
”The Hamas is being beleaguered from abroad and domestically.”45 This fact only 
increases her solidarity with Hamas. Her oldest son had recently tried on the uniform 
of her late husband who was in a security unit of the Fatah; he wants to fight for the




Hamas. “/  do not allow him to join the militia yet, he is only fifteen. That he can do 
when he is twenty.”46
The second article47 is the depressing story of three individuals, two of whom I 
like to refer to; a young man who resembles the true face of James Zogby’s example, 
and of a director of the UNRWA.48 The story of Ahmed Kahlout resembles the life 
of numerous others. The reporters find Ahmed only with the help of his uncle, who 
had to wake him up at midday. The twenty-three year old has a bachelor in pedagogy 
and wanted to become a teacher; instead he is unemployed and sleeps away the days.
“/  can’t marry because I  do not have the money to support a family; so I  am wasting 
my time.”49 We read that Ahmed is too apathetic to become radical, despite his 
misery. In that he is similar to the other 1.5 million people who live in Gaza; “they 
live a life which is defined by poverty and desperation. An existence in which the 
bloody fight between radical Islamic Hamas and the corrupt Fatah is just an 
additional misfortune.”50 The article then turns its attention to John Ging who works 
for the UNRWA. He informs the reporter about daily life in Gaza; how 89 percent of 
the people live in poverty, that they have less than $2/day, over 60 percent are 
unemployed, and since the election of the Hamas international aid money has been
held off -  which made even more people drift into poverty, over 860,000 peopleare  ̂ }_^
dependent on the food packages of the UNRWA, which i^ h d F o fTljelpQpSia^^. *— I
John Ging states that Palestinians in Gaza live in one big prison; that an atmosphere 
of hope had arisen with the opening of the boarder to Egypt, hope which turned into 
desperation as the bojrder remained de facto closed. Ging reports that because of ^  
Israeli pressure the bo lder is only opened 14% of the time, that goods were only ^  
arriving in limited amounts -  from the planned 400 trucks per day, only 14 arrived.
In addition European observers which are meant to oversee the boarder are living in 
Israel, and Israel was hindering them from coming to work, a mearr'to keep the 
boarder closed. Finally, people experience great difficulty in buying food. The 
markets are flooded with tomatoes, but there is no fish, despite having the sea on 
their doorstep, Israel imposes strict conditions which limit the Palestinian fishermen
46 IBID
47 Putz, Ulrike. "Der Bürgerkrieg wird alles aufiressen“. Der Spiegel. [Online] Available 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/auslandA), 1518,455111,00.html




from going out on the sea. Ging does not blame Israel alone however. He claims that 
the Hamas knew that international aid would stop if they would not comply with the 
conditions of the international community. The Hamas proceeded nonetheless and 
put up with the possibility that people would suffer -  a move which was 
irresponsible. Ging argues further that the international community has the right to 
stop the flow of aid money, but has to consider that he Palestinian government had 
been dependent on foreign aid by over seventy percent -  missing aid money turns 
into chaos. The most depressing analyzation being, that the people’s moral is 
completely down, that there no light at the end of the tunnel, and that a lost 
generation is being brought up. Ging tries to illustrate this, by arguing that it is hard 
to motivate children to go to school: “Try to animate youngsters to study, when they 
know that absolutely nothing is waiting for them when they graduate,”51
I believe that these two articles give a good example of the disillusionment of 
many Palestinians, but I also know that they can lead one to a biased opinion. In this 
effort I want to give reference to my final article52 about the small village of Sderot 
which is located close to the Gaza boarder.
The story of Sderot is quickly told: Sderot’s population of 24,000 lives only 
kilometers away from Gaza and many of the former residents have either left 
temporarily or for good. Since the beginning of the second intifada in 2000 more 
than 4,500 Qassam rockets53 have hit the city, which cost the lives of seven and 
injured many others. The article confronts the reader with the seven'yeapold Ariel, 
whose schoolmate has been killed by a rocket attack, and who now tends to hide 
under the kitchen table once he comes home. His thirteeivyea^old sister is still a bed- 
wetter, while his father suffers from nervous twitches; the family sleeps closely 
together in a room without an outside wall to prevent being hit by glass splinters in 
case of an explosion. The family is no exception, due to the constant attacks; a 
psychologist stated that almost half of the cities population suffers under post 
traumatic syndromes. The deputy major of Sderot Tal Nachshonov complains about 
the lack of support from the government, in his opinion not enough is done to
51 IBID
52 Heumann, Pierre. "Palästinenser Ziel Sderot“. Der Spiegel. [Online] Available 
http://www.spiegel,de/politik/ausland/0,1518,483779,00.html
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prevent the terrorist attacks from Gaza. Nachshonov has immigrated to Israel in the 
nineties from the Caucasus, and in his opinion the Russian handling of Chechnyans 
should serve as an example: “7 know how to deal with terrorist...taking Russia as a 
model...so that nothing remains o f the Palestinians that attack us.”54 Nachshonov 
concludes that Israel has to erect a ten kilometer buffer zone between its territory and 
Gaza; that Palestinians only understand the language of violence and to demonstrate 
that they should be cut off from the supply of water and electricity -  the Hamas has 
no interest in the end of the conflict, ‘for terrorists war means business.”55
The overriding themes of these articles: basic needs of food and water, security 
of job and family, confidence and the respect of others, can all be found in Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs. They are merely one mean in trying to find an understanding 
however. I would argue that the psychological dimension is only the first step 
towards finding an understanding of humans in general, but a necessary step which 
will enable us to find an understanding of the essential social and economic measures 
which need to be taken. If we re-read the story of Ahmed Kahlout; the twenty-three 
year old unemployed Palestinian, and take into account Maslow, how may we draw 
up a potential picture of his character? Could he be frustrated? May he feel left out, 
left out on the prospect of family and gaining honor and respect in his society? What 
can he expect of the future? The question becomes what should he expect from his 
government?
7.1. The failed Palestinian Social Contract
When the Hamas came out victorious in the January 2006 Palestinian 
Legislative elections - elections which gave it a majority in the Palestinian National 
Authority - many outsiders were caught off guard. Condoleezza Rice for one, 
admitted that nobody in her staff saw it coming; while the U.S. State Department, 
President Bush and other observers concluded that much of Hamas’ victory was due 




Authority, they had neglected other crucial factors why the Palestinian Authority 
under Fatah failed (San Francisco Chronicle, 8th of February, 200656).
These decisive reasons may be brought in perspective by exploring the concept 
known as a social contract. A social contract typically refers to an agreement 
between a government and its people, or in more general terms between members of 
a society, and defines and limits the rights and duties of each. The term social 
contract has been in use throughout the centuries, an earlier reference was for 
example made to Thomas Hobbes, who argued that people in a state of nature would 
give up their individual rights to create government/security.57 “In the MENA 
countries, the social contract encompasses a wider array o f factors than is commonly 
held in Europe. Conceptualized not solely as an institutionalized bargain among 
collective actors, it encompasses norms and shared expectations for the overall 
organizations o f a polity.”58 “Shared expectations” - 1 consider this to be part of the 
vital component of Middle Eastern culture, that the collective feeling towards 
government, is not only that of an individual towards the state, but that the 
government/head of state takes the role of a father figure and the people that of 
children/rest of the family, thus explaining the perhaps still existing tribal society. In 
addition to the naivety of large fractions of the population (bearing in mind that in 
many MENA countries large parts of the population enjoyed only limited education), 
many believe in the projection created from and about leaders. Michael N. Barnett 
quotes Harvard professor Stephen M. Walt in this regard: “In the Arab world, the 
most important source o f power has been the ability to manipulate one’s own image 
and the image o f one’s rivals in the minds o f other Arab elites.”59 It may also explain 
the disappointment with Yasser Arafat: Middle Easterners tend to be more forgiving 
with corrupt and inefficient governments - the rulers as I said are seen as father 
figures - but it became evident that Arafat had let his people down, hope was fading 
away, which lead towards a disappointment similar to that experienced in family 
affairs. The statement: ”He is a crook -  but he is our crook?', can easily be applied 
here, but Arafat went too far, and that partially opened the door for Hamas. If we are
56 San Francisco Chronicle, February 8th 2006
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to label the election of Hamas as a setback, then we should investigate the roots -  
and might as well agree that someone is to be put at fault. Although Yasser Arafat 
and the Fatah can be held responsible for their failure to a large extent, they can not 
be blamed alone.
In an article published on the MERIP60 webpage, professor Joel Beinin 
explains the victory for Hamas: “The Bush administration's simple faith in elections 
has distracted it from comprehending the realities that Palestinians live with daily. 
What they have not understood is that an election is only a formal procedure. 
Substantive democracy requires the rule o f law, protection o f civil liberties and 
minority rights, physical security, a reasonable standard o f living, sovereignty and 
political independence. The Palestinians have none o f these. This is a source o f 
Hamas' popularity that President Bush fails to grasp.”61 Professor Beinin further 
notes part of Hamas’ victory can be explained by the corrupt and ineffective Fatah, 
but that the most crucial problem is the continued Israeli occupation. “concerted \
efforts to destroy the infrastructure o f the P.A., the expansion o f settlements, !
construction o f a separation barrier effectively annexing large parts o f the West , 
Bank, military raids and many internal restrictions on movement. The Bush
administration's unwillingness to press Israel to ease the occupation and thus allow j
i
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas real political successes meant that Abbas \
i
could not present a credible alternative to Hamas.” In taking Beimn into account, 
we may thus argue that it was not only the Fatah which is to put to blame, but that in 
general the conditions were not set to enforce a social contract between the P.A. and 
the Palestinians, that it simply had to fail, and that this failure lead to the victory of 
Hamas. In addition we have to consider the fact that there is no actual Palestinian 
state, or representative body, to enforce such a social contract if it is constantly 
confronted with an occupying Israel.
The Palestinians have drawn up a constitution as far back as 1997, but it was 
signed only in 2002 (a third draft has been revised in March 2003). The Basic Law 
enshrines democracy, separation of power and judicial independence -  it defines the 
powers of the P.A. and will serve as the constitution until the establishment of a
60 The Middle East Research and Information Project




Palestinian state. I would also argue that the Israeli state has to have an interest in the 
facilitation of a social contract, and the ability to enforce it. The German-British 
sociologist and politician Ralf Dahrendorf argues that the ones that have (the Israelis) 
have to include all (the Palestinians) in the general society in their own interest, not 
because they need them, but in order to protect their own lives and values. I would 
thus go as far as saying, that primarily the state of Israel is hindering the successful 
implementation of a social contract, in addition to the corrupt Palestinian officials 
which have to a large extent only enriched themselves and left the general Palestinian 
society to its own. The scenario which arose as a consequence, that the power given 
to the P.A. was misused, and with the election of Hamas the Palestinians reacted to 
this misuse of power, is aptly formulated by Dr. Karma Nabulsi: ” What happens 
when a people place their sovereignty into the hands o f their leadership, and their 
leaders ’ own hands are then tied, and they are lost in a terrible prison, as i f  trapped 
in a dark enchantment?...The people eventually take their force back, for it is 
sovereign...For authority is only lent, and only for as long as the leadership can find  
a way to represent it: sovereignty, since it is nothing less than the exercise o f the 
general will, can never be alienated, and that the Sovereign, who is nothing but a 
collective being, can only be represented by himself: the power indeed may be
f t ' Xtransmitted, but not the wilF .
63 Nabulsi, Karma. “Being Palestinian” University College London [Online] Available 
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8 - M E D IA , TERRORISM  A N D  T H E  W O R K  O F LO BB Y  G ROUPS
“Terrorists, terrorists, terrorists. In the Middle East, in the entire Muslim 
world, this word would become a plague, a meaningless punctuation mark in all our 
lives, a fu ll stop erected to finish all discussion o f injustice, constructed as a wall by 
Russians, Americans, Israelis, British, Pakistanis, Saudis, Turks, to shut us up. Who 
would ever say a word in favour o f terrorists? What cause could justify terror? So 
our enemies are always ‘terrorist’. In the seventeenth century, governments used 
‘heretic’ in much the same way, to end all dialogue, to prescribe obedience...you are 
either with us or against us. For decades, I  have listened to this dangerous equation, 
uttered by capitalist and communist, presidents and prime ministers, generals and 
intelligence officers and, o f course, newspaper editors.”6*
The chapter’s title Media, Terrorism and the Work o f Lobby Groups may 
confront the reader with an illogical amalgamation, but to a large extent I believe it to 
be a combination that makes very much sense as I would like to elucidate now. I 
have pointed out in earlier paragraphs, that much of the common citizens’ opinion is 
based upon what is seen and read in the media. This fact becomes especially evident 
when confronting any ordinary pedestrian in the street, asking how one would 
imagine a “terrorist” to look like (I have given the example of the train ride I took to 
my home town, and the perception of Arab-looking men). There are various voices 
in the political and media science sphere which have spoken out over this 
development, of an evolution of media misuse to achieve political goals. In this effort 
I would like to comment on the role of media; how it shapes our minds and creates 
perceptions; how apt the term terrorism is in defining the Middle East and the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict; and finally defining the scope of work by lobby groups. 
Much of the following paragraphs are based on the work and research of M.I.T.65 
professor Noam Chomsky; despite being accused from,many of constructing 
conspiracy theories in regard to the role of media in society and politics, I would 
attest that Chomsky too keeps “things in perspective”, and is a credible source.
64 Fisk, Robert. The Great War for Civilization -  The Conquest of the Middle East. London: Harper Perennial. 
2006, pg. 74
65 M.I.T. -  Massachusetts Institute o f Technology
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In preparing the reader for an analyses on the “war on terror”, how the 
terminology is used in the context of modem media and opinion building, Chomsky 
introduces the concept of propaganda and its role in influencing society. The first 
modem propaganda operations were conducted under the Wilson presidency, at a 
time when much of the American society was rather pacifist and the idea of being 
securely isolated from the rest of the world was still prevalent. The Wilson 
presidency had decided to enter the war however, and now needed to find a mean in 
order to change and win the public’s approval to go to war. For this matter the so- 
called Creel Commission66 was formed, and within six months it managed to turn the 
population enthusiastic about the war. “All o f a sudden people wanted to destroy 
everything German, to rip the Germans into pieces, and to go to war to save the 
world.” Chomsky adds that this method was also successful after the war in 
spreading the “Red Scare”, which refers to a fear of the spread of communism. The 
usage of such tactics is what Chomsky refers to as “manufacturing consent”, a catch 
phrase which he derived from the title of a book by Walter Lippmann.
8.1. Manufacturing Consent
In knowing how to successfully raise consent over future political actions, 
decision makers have to know into which camps voters and potential decision 
makers fall. In this respect it is useful to explore the concept of “doves and hawks”. 
In the political context “doves” represent those factions which maintain a more 
moderate, perhaps even pacifistic standpoint, and are hence equated to liberal 
policies. The “hawks” on the other hand, are those we would attest to hold 
conservative policies (please refer to Appendix D for further explanation). Walter 
Lippmann brought up an earlier notion of a concept similar to that of doves and 
hawks. Lippmann argued that “a ‘revolution in the art o f democracy’ could lead to 
‘manufacture consent’, which meant that by using new means o f propaganda 
techniques it was possible to manipulate the public’s opinion on events it initially
66 Creel Commission -  The Committee on Public Information, also known as the CPI and the Creel Committee, 
was intended to influence U.S. public opinion regarding American intervention in World War I. It was established 
under President Woodrow Wilson as an independent agency by Executive order 2594, April 13,1917. The 
committee consisted of George Creel (Chairman) and Secretaries of State (Robert Lansing), War (Lindley M. 
Garrison), and the Navy (Josephus Daniels) as ex officio members.
67 Chomsky, Noam. Media Control -  Wie die Medien uns manipulieren. Munich: Serie Piper. 2006, pg. 29
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rejected.”6* He actually argued that the interest of the polity is excluded from public 
opinion, meaning that only a few responsible men who possess the necessary 
knowledge are capable of taking the right steps for the greater good. The process of 
dividing society into classes, leaves two essential groups: those of specialist, a small 
percentage of the population which is able to analyze, and make decisions on the 
political, economical and ideological system; while the other group is that of the 
confused and large herd, from who’s “stamping and noise” the specialist have to 
protect themselves. Noam Chomsky rephrases this theory and concludes: “Behind 
this theory lays logic and even a compelling moral principle. It states that the masses 
are too asinine to comprehend larger coherences. I f  it (the population) attempts to 
participate in governing its own matters, it only disturbs a smooth development. 
Therefore it would be immoral and irresponsible to demand such. We have to tame 
the herd, so that it does not trample down everything. To permit its participation in 
governing its own matters, would be as foolish as to allow a three-year old to cross 
the street on its own, because it would endanger itself and others with this 
freedom.”69
What Chomsky is arguing, is that we as citizens are exposed to an apparatus 
which, not necessarily in all areas of the world, but especially in the United States 
uses the media to influence public opinion. One of the important elements of such 
tactic is also to be found in finding the appropriate technique to get the right message 
across to an audience. It is said for example, that to comprehend a common yellow 
press paper, one has to have a vocabulary of only 200 to 300 words. This explains 
why the headlines are easily understood. It explains further why in the political 
jargon, statements such as “You are either with me or against me” find large 
approval in wide society. Noam Chomsky explains this by referring to the well 
known PR-slogan: “Support our troops”. Chomsky argues that the question could as 
well be: “Do you support our politics! '’ “Good propaganda invents a slogan to 
which all can agree without having to know what it means, because it does not mean 
anything. Its value and purpose is to turn the attention away from the really 
meaningful question: »Do you support our politics?« Instead people think about the 
question whether or not to support the troops. »Of course I  am not opposing to do
68 IBID, pg. 30
69 IBID, pg. 31
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so.« Thus propaganda won.'''’ The idea is to aim at the subconscious, to a point where 
the slogan’s real message does not need be questioned. Of course we support our 
troops - after all we do not want to stand on the other side.
8.2. Creating Images
The influence which media has in creating images and perceptions is 
omnipresent and has existed ever since; especially when this “reality” about non- 
westerns is manufactured in the United States. I experienced this personally when 
attending the American school in Cairo and later on graduating from high school at a 
boarding school in Connecticut. Fortunately I never much cared for such wisdoms, 
but I was always astonished how Arabs (as I had arrived from Egypt I was placed, to 
my surprise, in this class), Europeans, but especially Germans were seen. Of course 
there were exceptions, but the often times not too charming illustrations of Germans 
in American movies did not necessarily help me much (if it is not a Russian that 
wants to take over the world, it must be a German). In Islam and the West: The 
Making o f an Image, Norman Daniel convincingly demonstrates that the negative 
portrayals of Islam date back to early Christian exegesis and are therefore deeply 
imbedded in western culture. These negative depictions are often passed on from one 
generation to the next; perhaps oneself has made this experience as well, being 
advised that some people can not be trusted simply because grandfather already said 
so.
It is also worthy to evaluate the importance given to news coverage on 
domestic or international issues, the task has now become to evaluate what is deemed 
as newsworthy and what is not. “Because a handful o f individuals or international 
corporations now own and control media communications, including cable and large 
television networks, motion pictures, radio stations, magazines and newspapers, a 
near ‘unanimity o f view ’ has emerged in the presentation o f all issues, not only those 
dealing with the Middle East. In addition, some analysts have argued that corporate 
ownership o f most media sources has made the media more conservative and prone
70to support the established and powerful elite.” What Janice Terry simply points out
70 Terry, Janice J. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East -  The Role o f Lobbies and Special Interest Groups.
Ann Arbor: Pluto Press. 2005, pg. 15
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to, is that debate in the media over issues related to the Middle East has become 
limited to a small group of commentators (in Germany there are about three of such 
experts which are constantly questioned in the media when trying to find an 
explanation to events occurring in the Middle East). Although there are about 1,000 
academic specialists on the Middle East at universities in the United States, only few 
of them are ever asked to discuss contemporary issues. “Those that contradict the 
prevailing wisdom or offer ‘hard truths ’ about the region and U.S. policies quickly 
find  themselves droppedfrom the guest lists.”71
The often times slanted articles, books and media coverage deserve a brief 
observation as well. The dichotomy of cultures, dividing the world into different and 
competing societies, has been emphasized perhaps most prominently by Samuel P. 
Huntington in his Clash o f Civilizations (others have published similar works). “On 
both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash o f 
civilizations. The West’s ‘next confrontation, ’ observes M.J. Akbar, an Indian 
Muslim author, is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep 
o f the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new 
world order will begin...they will attempt to reconcile this modernity with their 
traditional culture and values...this will require the West to maintain the economic 
and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to this civilizations. 72 
I do not disregard everything Huntington argues for, after all he also concludes that 
we have to learn to coexist with each other, but his work serves two deeds which we 
should consider: It corresponds to the political ideology of some radical Islamist that 
only search for grounds to further isolate their societies from the West, and further 
helps them to paint a demonic picture of western society; in addition this portrait of 
the “sick” Arab/Muslim world was marshaled by the neo-conservatives to justify the
2003 American led war against Iraq. We may speculate that sources as such justified 
President Bush’s led mission to “break the chains of tyranny”, because as Marcus 
Tullius Cicero once said “men o f good will, mindful therefore o f the Law laid down 
by God, oppose governments whose rule is by men, and i f  they wish to survive as a 
nation they will destroy the government which attempts to adjudicate by the whim o f
71 IBID
72 Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations” Foreign Affairs: Summer 1993, v72, n3, p22(28)
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venal j u d g e s The debate over a “Clash o f Civilizations”, additionally aids in using 
a powerful tool in changing the attitude of society - the element of fear. “Neo-
*■»
liberalism has generated new forms o f insecurity, marginality and precariousness
that reinforce an individualized, privatized sense o f responsibility for the
management o f risk, and undermine the micro-solidarities that tied people to family,
community, and work. At the same time, the neo-conservative side o f New Right
ideology has capitalized on these fears and uncertainties to promote more coercive
forms o f social control as the panacea for solving a whole range o f social
problems.”74 After all Machiavelli already suggested that “it better to be feared than
loved", an idea that certainly plays in the hands of politicians.
It is important to evaluate the role of media, especially in regards to the recent
terminology we have been confronted with, such as the “war on terror”, “the axis of
evil” and “breeding grounds of tyranny”. In addition we have to remind ourselves
about the actual truths, reminding ourselves to “keep things in perspective”.
Renowned British journalist Robert Fisk wrote: “They want their people to see war
as a drama o f opposites, good and evil, 'them ’ and ‘us victory and defeat, (the
image portrayed in the media) But war is primarily not about victory or defeat but
about death and the infliction o f death. It represents the total failure o f human spirit 
•jf
(The truth).” It is a principle of broad culture that we like to carefully examine the 
faults, mistakes and crimes of others, but never our own. Which also explains why 
some world powers do not adhere to any authority and neither accept any demands to 
supply evidence. Finally we should also consider that one-sided media images can 
serve multiple functions and are able to have “a damaging impact under presidents 
such as Roland Reagan and George W. Bush, who are not widely read and who pay 
little attention to detail (which is also applicable to the average citizen); and by 
forming the cultural backdrop that made the abuses against Arabs and Muslims in 
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and elsewhere possible, i f  not probable.”76
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In this respect I would like to give a last quote of Noam Chomsky, which very 
much describes my own perspective of evaluating matters with a sober mind: “The 
self proclaimed leaders against the war on terror endorse that they are faithful 
Christians, which hold the New Testaments in honor. Thus they will also know whom 
the Gospels identify to be hypocrite -  a hypocrite is a human that raises moral 
standards for others, but does not accept them for himself”11
8.3. Terrorism
“The Middle East is commonly considered tó be a region especially vulnerable 
to terrorism and the chief exporter o f terrorism to other parts o f the world. Some 
have argued that Islam, unlike Christianity or Judaism, has a special propensity to 
violence against nonbelievers. Moreover, Israel, the United States, and “the West" 
are often portrayed as the primary victims o f terrorism emanating from the Middle
7o
East ”. Professor of Middle East history at Stanford University, Joel Beinin touches 
upon a fact which is all too common. Professor Tomáš Halik argues that in today’s 
world we are worried about the conflict between parts of the Arab world and the 
West; in addition a number of people in our Western societies are incapable or 
differentiating between Islam and terrorists which shield themselves behind Islam. 
The media certainly accounts for a large share in this development. We associate 
terrorism with Islam, while Muslims associate the mainly American influenced 
media to Western society as a whole. The question I would like to address is, what 
exactly is terrorism? I suppose the best source for an adequate definition has to be 
derived from a respected authority which originates from the country that dominates 
the current debate over terrorism.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) states that: “Terrorism 
is the use o f force or violence against persons or property in violation o f the 
criminal laws o f the United States for purposes o f intimidation, coercion, or 
ransom. Terrorists often use threats to; create fear among the public, try to 
convince citizens that their government is powerless to prevent terrorism, get
77 Chomsky, Noam. Media Control -  Wie die Medien uns manipulieren. Munich: Serie Piper. 2006, pg. 29




immediate publicity fo r their causes. Acts o f terrorism include threats o f terrorism; 
assassinations; kidnappings; hijackings; bomb scares and bombings; cyber attacks 
(computer-based); and the use o f chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological 
weapons.”19 So much to the definition, but how are we supposed to protect 
ourselves from terrorism then? According to FEMA, some of the precautions we 
can take is being aware of our surrpunding; being aware of conspicuous or unusual 
behaviour and by being prepared to do without services (such as electricity, 
telephone, gas, and cash) one normally depends on. I would argue that FEMA’s 
recommendations help us understand the impact of terrorism, and especially the 
consequences which occur when it is mentioned in the media. At one point it went 
so far that American citizens build bunkers in their backyards in fear of a possible 
Russian nuclear attack, whereas today this “created feeling” of fear and paranoia 
leads much to the suspicion of what is foreign, unknown and not comprehendible 
(page 36). I would like to come back to the usage of terrorism in a purely political 
form. In his book, Terrorism: How the West Can Win - Benjamin Netanyahu80 
defines terrorism as: “the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and 
menacing o f the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.” Joel Beinin argues that 
Netanyahu’s definition is provisionally serviceable if applied to both states and 
nonstate actors, that is does however beg the question of who is innocent and what 
constitutes innocence in conflictual situations. In this light terrorism has been going 
on in the Middle East throughout the modem era, and the politically motivated 
violence directed against civilian populations can essentially be classified into eight 
types according to Beinin. I do not wish to elaborate on all types; I shall briefly list 
them and proceed with finding an answer in which degree terrorism has to be
o 1
considered in the context of modem discussion. According to Beinin the eighty 
types of political motivated violence are:
■ Atrocities committed by European states in the course of imperial 
expeditions.
■ Atrocities committed in the course of repressing anti-colonial rebellions.
79 Federal Emergency Management Agency. “General Information About Terrorism” [Online] Available 
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■ Riots against European setter populations.
■ Organized violence by nationalist politico-military organizations directed at
either civilian settlers or civilians in the apparatus of colonial rule.
■ Counterattacks by colonial settlers.
■ Acts of states against foreign enemies.
■ Acts of states against those perceived as internal enemies.
■ The final type being defined by the last two or three decades in which the
United States and European states have been targeted by Arab nationalists 
or political Islamists opposed to the role of the United States and Europe in 
the Middle East. While in the same* period, Islamist radicals have 
assassinated political figures, civilians, and Europeans in Egypt, the state 
apparatus has responded with massive violations of civil and human rights, 
including the torture of suspected militants.
Joel Beinin makes another important observation in this respect. He notes 
that the most prominent locales of politically motivated violence against civilians 
in the Middle East, Algeria and Israel/Palestine, are linked to their histories as sites 
of the most extensive European colonial settlement in the region. Islam is not the 
decisive factor, despite its significant role in mobilizing resistance; rather that 
contention is a product of postcolonial anxieties about U.S. global supremacy and 
the regional dominance of the U.S.-Israeli alliance in the Middle East.
“The Bush administration’s adaptation o f Ariel Sharon’s specious argument 
that Yasser Arafat and Osama bin Laden are equivalents demonstrates how easily 
the term can be abused to obscure the disparate histories o f events that appear 
superficially similar.”*2 The Palestinians have surely carried out horrible attacks on 
Israeli civilians, but the comparison between the al-Qaeda and the Palestinian 
intifada holds no weight. At the same time Israeli civilians (such as the orthodox 
Barukh Goldstein83) and the Israeli army (only consider the conduct of the Israeli 
army during the 1982 Sabra and Shatila refugee camp raids84) have committed
82 IBID
83 Barukh Goldstein gunned down twenty-nine Muslim worshipers in the middle of Friday prayers at the Cave of 
the Patriarchs/Ibrahim Mosque in 1994. It is the burial site of Abraham in the Jewish and Muslim traditions. To 
avenge Goldstein’s act the Hamas launched the first suicide bombings in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
84 An act carried out in September 1982 by a Lebanese Forces militia group against Palestinian refugee camps. 
The number of victims of the massacre is estimated at 700-3500. The camps were externally surrounded by Israeli 
Defense Forces throughout the incident, although the Israeli military personnel who were there stated that they had 
no idea of what was going on inside.
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similar acts of violence which have only spread further hate. The principle issue in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the abstract form of terrorism, but the 
Palestinian struggle to establish their own sovereign state.
In his conclusion Beinin raises the question if “the term terrorism can be 
rescued from its imbrication in such as web o f propaganda? Is it worth doing 
so?”*5 The problem in assessing terrorism is after all found in determining who sets 
the measure, what are acts o f terrorism and what are acts for freedom. The old 
saying that “one person's terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter” is ever 
prevalent, not only in the Middle East. Throughout the history of the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict we are able to find arguments which defend the actions of one’s 
own side, while condemning those of the opposing camp. The media too portrays 
history or current events in different lights, depending on its origin and ideological 
makeup (despite claiming to be neutral). I remember being thought “that history is 
written by the victors”, and I believe that Winston Churchill was the author of this 
still customary tradition. What has to be considered moreover is that the process of 
radicalization is not to be comprehended by solely looking at the crisis in the 
Middle East. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict in addition to the invasion of Iraq 
surely stirred up strong anti-American and anti-Western sentiments, but the 
connection remains symbolic. In assessing the attitude after September 11 in Arab 
countries, the media noted that sympathy for the attacks was found in opinion polls 
in the Middle East. Nobody has conducted such polls in Buenos Aires or Mexico 
City. In the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the media and public prematurely 
concluded that Arabs or Muslims were responsible for the death of 168 and the 
injury of 800 civilians (until September 11th the deadliest act of terrorism in the 
United States). Only afterwards did we hear of Timothy McVeigh; the media had 
not labelled him as a “Christian terrorist” however.
“Attacking civilians in any conflict is morally indefensible and politically 
counterproductive, but the case o f settler colonialism proves more complex than 
most...Colonial settlement involves the dispossession and disenfranchisement o f  
indigenous populations, even when it does not entail direct violence. Hence attacks 
on civilians are a common feature o f struggles against setter colonialism...The
85 Beinin, Joel. “Is Terrorism a Useful Term in Understanding the Middle East and the Palestinian-Israeli 
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reprehensible attacks on civilians by Palestinian extremists should not annual the 
national rights o f the Palestinian people.”u  The role of media is thus an important 
element when considering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As outsiders we have to 
remain critical in trying to establish and understanding of what we hold to be true. 
The final topic of this influential triangle is that of the work of lobby groups. 
Lobby groups are well acquainted with the influence and proper use of the media 
(to support their means). It is of noteworthy significance to explore the history and 
role lobby groups have in the United States - especially with emphasis on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the way they are able to alter U.S. foreign policy - 
and to then focus on the work of the Arab and Israeli lobbies.
8.4. The History and Role o f Lobby Groups
To understand the role of lobby groups; to which extent they take influence on 
the decision making process especially in the politics of the United States; one has to 
have an equal understanding of developments in the code of conduct in this particular 
field. “Since World War II, Congressional involvement has generally declined while
R7that o f the President, his close advisers and, in particular, the NSC has grown.” 
The National Security Council (NSC) is “the President's principal forum for  
considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national 
security advisors and cabinet officials. Since its inception under President Truman, 
the function o f the Council has been to advise and assist the President on national 
security and foreign policies. The Council also serves as the President's principal 
arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies. ”88 The 
important factor in regards to NSC advisers is that they are appointed to office, they 
report directly to the president and are not hindered by the duties of regular 
politicians. We have to consider that even though the U.S. Congress holds substantial 
power in major areas of foreign aid formation (such as foreign aid, arms deals, etc.), 
it is the president and his advisors that like to place key decision making in their 
domain. We are thus confronted with a small elite group which makes foreign policy,
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and it is this field in which lobby groups try to tap in. The question becomes what the 
exact role of a lobbyist is, what defines a lobbyist’s scope o f work, and what real 
influence does he or she have. Operating within the constraints of the system, 
lobbyists (and pressure groups) manipulate and make use of the prevailing cultural 
milieu, first to gain access to, and then to convince, policy-makers to adopt policies 
that are favorable to their specific agendas (for example the strong farmer lobby in 
many EU countries). Specifically, they want a comfortable competitive advantage 
over other industries “Under United States law, a lobbyist is defined as an individual 
or organization whose job is to ‘influence the passing or defeat o f legislation ’ and 
who receives money for that purpose. By the 1990’s, there were over 80,000 
registered lobbyists in Washington.”89 Thus a lobbyist’s role can be summed up in 
being able to influence and possibly change a decision makers’ choice in favor of the 
lobbyist’s interest.
In having an understanding how lobbyists function, we must also consider the 
decisive factors in the policy-making process (I will focus solely on the United States 
here). Opinion polls are one of the most important elements in weighing out popular 
sentiment; a trend which has also swept over to Europe. In the United States opinion 
polls are used on a regular basis to determine into which direction a politician should 
stir his program in order to gain a maximum number of voters/support. In the 1976 
elections for example, one insider suggested (on the basis of opinion polls) to Ford 
that: “From the perspective o f the coming elections, it is apparent that a policy which 
hurts or appears to hurt Israel and appeases the Arab demands will carry a stiff 
political price in the United States, and a price which the Republican party should 
not be asked to pay. But it would also be a lost opportunity to rally the American 
public behind a country widely perceived as a reliable, democratic ally at a time *
a 1
when we have so few allies left around the world.”90 I suppose similar advises have \ r \ \A ^
been made in recent years in considering U.S. politics towards reliable allies. It also g f
portrays how carefully politicians need to assess the possible outcome of measures 
they would like to incorporate in their program; they can ultimately cost voters, and 
it would thus be an avoidable mistake not to alter political choices to the most 
favorable outcome in elections. The U.S. elections of the year 2000 resulted in an
89 Terry, Janice J. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East -  The Role o f Lobbies and Special Interest Groups. 
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incomprehensible outcome for countless observers from the outside; how a candidate 
could loose that actually managed to attain the most votes baffled many around the 
globe. The answer is to be found in the voting system and procedures of the United 
States, which is yet another useful mean in understanding the role of lobbyists.
The outstanding feature in respect to voting and the role of lobby groups in the 
United States, is that essentially only two ethnic groups have persistently supported 
favorable lobbying efforts for their respective camp; the anti-Castro Cuban 
Americans and the Jewish Americans. Other ethnic groups only take a stand on 
lobbying efforts on a case by case basis (such as the Greek lobby group in the case 
over Cyprus for example). In addition it is noteworthy to comment on the small 
number of American citizens that vote, not to mention those that are informed about 
the political landscape. According to the Pew Research Center, “in 1999, 56 percent 
o f Americans could not name one Democratic candidate for the president in the 2000 
election.”91 A similar stunning observation was by the National Election survey 
which stated that “in 2000, 53 percent o f electors were not aware that George W. ^
O') ... ■ » ,Bush was a conservative, 30 percent thought he was a moderate.” These statistics 
are not meant to paint a negative image on the American public, I am convinced that 
we have similarly well informed voters in Europe, but it leads me to an essential 
observation. According to Janice Terry only 70 percent of the U.S. population is 
eligible to vote. Out of those 70 people (if we take 100 people as 100%), only 60 
percent -  or 42 people actually register. In a best case scenario only 50 percent or 21 
people, actually vote. The important consideration, a candidate only needs 50 
percent, plus one, or simply 11 out of 100 to win. In other words, a politician only 
needs to appeal to 11 out of 100 people. It explains why a small, well-organized, and 
influential lobby group can determine the outcome of an election to a substantial 
degree. In consideration of lobby groups, we must also note that most of American 
Jews and American Arabs live in states that have a determining influence in the 
outcome of U.S. elections, states such as Florida, Michigan and California. The 
determining difference being that Jewish Americans are far more active and better 
organized. “O f all the ethnic groups in this country, Jews take the most active interest 
in elections and vote more assiduously than almost any other population group. They




also contribute heavily to campaigns and engage actively in work at both the 
national and state level ...though less than three percent o f the U.S. population, Jews 
comprise between four to five percent o f the total vote. In contrast, African 
Americans -  eleven percent o f the population -  only account for five percent o f the 
total vote. ”93 In an effort to shed further light on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I 
thus find of great importance to evaluate the role of Jewish and Arab lobby groups in 
the United States, and in which way they take an influence on the foreign policy 
making process of this country. Before I discuss the individual lobby efforts of the 
pro-Arab and pro-Israeli lobby groups, a few notes on the techniques lobbyists use in 
influencing decision-making processes.
8.5. Lobby Techniques
Paid lobbyists operate under the common set of rules that do not necessarily 
deem to effect pressure or interest groups. Rules that lobbyists profess to live by 
include: tell the truth, only promise what you can produce, listen and work with 
government personnel and, most importantly, do not surprise politicians with 
unexpected proposals or demands. Lobbyists and pressure groups must clearly define 
their agendas and know the influential decision-makers. Access in this respect is 
essential. Lobbyists can sometimes be successful on the basis of a close, personal 
relationship with just one powerful senator or representative (remember Mr. Calouste
S. Gulbenkian). Embassies, diplomats, business functionaries, and other 
representatives can all function as lobbyists. The role of lobbyist is to inform, 
educate, and provide information to policy-makers on issues relevant to the 
lobbyist’s interest. Sometimes lobby groups are the only source of information when 
operating in a new field, or a field in which insider’s knowledge and access are 
essential. As for the pro-Arab and pro-Israeli lobby groups in the United States, it 
encompasses supplying government officials with monthly information packages, 
hosting dinners, sponsoring flights to respective countries; all to ensure that exchange 
of vital information retains to the utmost standard. However, the pro-Israeli pressure
93 Terry, Janice J. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle E ast-T he Role o f Lobbies and Special Interest Groups. 
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and lobby groups are much more consistent and persistent in these information 
campaigns - in addition they present a much more coherent front. Once again we can 
note that the pro-Arab lobby groups, presumably based on their heritage, have 
difficulties in presenting a more unified front in respect to Arab issues. A further 
important aspect in the lobby groups’ sphere, is that pro-Israeli lobby groups see the 
lobbying efforts as a zero-sum game. In a zero-sum game there is a fixed pie, which 
means that if one group manages to get a piece of the pie, less is left for the others. 
Instead of enlarging the pie in general (increasing everyone’s influence), the 
philosophy behind the zero-sum game is that only one party can remain maximum 
access. It is seen as essential not to loose a piece of the pie, and to prevent increased 
influence of the other group. Thus lobby groups of different interests can often stand 
in conflict with each other.
Presidents are particularly vulnerable to political pressures in election years. 
Because first term presidents enter office already running for a second term, each 
must frame his foreign policy during the first four years in office within the 
constraints of domestic political considerations. In this respect Janice Terry quotes an 
interview she held with President Carter over his presidency and notes that: “Had he 
been elected to a second term, Carter would have pursued the unresolved portions o f  
the Camp David agreement with 'tremendous vigor’. After leaving office, Carter 
publicly and correctly stated that he feared Prime Minister Begin had decided to 
ignore Camp David and would continue to confiscate property and land in the West 
Bank. Carter believed that some Arabs were ready to negotiate but were waiting for  
signs that Israel would do so in good faith. On this basis he anticipated that in his 
second term he could push through agreements involving Palestinian right without 
the ‘political constraints ...o f a first term president in these areas”94. As we are able 
to see once again, weighing out the population’s sentiment is of crucial importance in 
politics. The influence of lobby groups is thus a serious factor to consider.
A final feature in the lobbyist’s scope of work is pressuring individual 
congressional representatives and senators to support specific legislation. Such 
efforts are operated by so-called PACs or Political Action Committees. PACs have 
been one of the most effective ways for individuals and groups to help politicians
94 IBID, pg. 39
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who support their causes get elected. PACs will be discussed in further detail in the 
subsequent paragraphs and I shall now turn my attention to the respective lobbyists.
8.6. Pro-Arab Lobby Groups
The important factor in determining the role of the pro-Arab lobby efforts in 
the United States is to consider the history of Middle Eastern countries. Middle 
Eastern countries have always stood on a different supporting leg in Washington, 
many Arab officials for example thought that lobbying was illegal and that all their 
efforts should be directed solely through their diplomatic officers. “In the 1950’s, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser actually had to ask an aide, who lived in the Untied States, 
‘What is a lobby? ’ He also asked for a definition o f ‘picket lines. ’ Neither term 
existed in Arabic in the manner applied to U.S. politics. Although E gyp t-in  contrast 
to many other Arab states -  had a well-established Foreign Service, it did not have a 
full-time lobbyist in Washington until the 1970s.”95 It is perhaps also an assertive 
feature of Arab mentality that many Arabs in the early stages of lobby efforts 
believed, that the only effective way to influence policy was to have access and good 
relations to the top man -  meaning the president.
The League of Arab states96 for example would seem to be the appropriate 
organization to spearhead Arab lobby efforts, but it has also failed to come up with 
effective means to capture the attention of the American audience. This is also due to 
the wide spread ignorance of the American political system in the Middle East, 
understanding what the driving forces are behind decision making. Studying the 
history and culture of the United States is only offered by few schools, mainly 
private ones; in addition there are only few universities that offer American Studies 
programs. This has put the Arab countries to a great disadvantage over Israel, which 
from an early stage on had understood how vital it would be to know their potential 
allies and enemies. A further example is offering simply services such as language 
courses; while in Israel there are centers to learn about Arab history and culture as
95 IBID, pg. 50
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well as Arabic language (not to mention about the U.S. and English), many Arab 
countries remain reluctant to offer similar services (in respect to Hebrew and Israel). 
This is an investment which has paid out for the Israelis. The same discrepancies 
have been occurring in understanding to successfully use the media, a mean which I 
touched upon earlier. Edward Said97 noted in an interview in 2001 “...since Israel 
was established [over 50 years ago], the Israelis and their supporters in this country 
have put untold amounts o f effort and money into propaganda, in regards to which 
not one single Arab regime or even the [PLO] has understood the power o f the 
media and propaganda in this country. And that, I  think, is a major crime o f 
responsibility for every Arab leader and intellectual who considers himself to be 
serious. We still have no understanding o f the power o f the media and what you 
might call the ‘cultural work’ o f civil society...And Israel has just announced
QO
another $100 million campaign to improve its image. And we do nothing. ” 
Establishing degree programs for American studies in the Arab world; offering 
language course in Hebrew at cultural centers; and having an understanding of the 
driving factors of U.S. policy making, are all steps in the right direction for the 
Middle Eastern countries, their problem being that Israel has a fifty-year head start.
To point out the essential short comings and future tasks of the pro-Arab lobby 
groups, I would like to summarize that:
■ Arab regimes and some Arab Americans often operate too independently
from one another, an aspect that they need to improve if they want to
successfully increase the Arab voice in Washington.
■ Pro-Arab publications such as the Washington Report on the Middle East, the
Gulf Wire Digest or the Middle East Policy have to find means in attracting a
wider audience, in aiding to inform the public and break down
misconceptions. In addition more think tanks such as the Institute for  
Research: Middle Eastern Policy (IRMEP) have to be established.
■ Pro-Arab lobby groups need to establish campaigns which portray the Middle 
East in more positive light. Many Arab-Americans are afraid to speak out for
97 Edward Said - Was a Palestinian-American literary theorist and outspoken Palestinian activist. He was 
Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, and is regarded as a founding figure in 
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the interest of their native countries. Instilling a sense of pride among Arab- 
Americans will not only increase support and financial aid, but help in 
producing constructive aid (instead of having a timid minority which is too 
afraid to offer valuable advice).
The most important task for pro-Arab lobby groups however, is to find means 
in attracting additional funding. “A comparison o f Arab American/Muslim PACs with 
pro-Israeli PAC’s demonstrates this disparity. In 1984, pro-Arab PACs raised 
$17,350 in contrast to pro-Israeli PACs that raised $3,772,994, or a ratio o f 147-1; 
by 1996 the figures had improved only marginally from $20,625 to $2,738,647 or a 
ration or 133 to 1. Without major financial support, no protracted lobby effort or 
media campaign is p o s s i b l e Without substantial increases in the amount of 
funding, pro-Arab lobby groups will forever remain in the shadow of the strong pro- 
Israeli lobby groups.
8.7. Jewish American and Pro-Israeli Lobby Groups
The strong pro-Israeli standpoint on many critical issues of U.S. foreign policy 
in the Middle East is a direct result of the successful work of the Jewish American 
and pro-Israeli lobby groups in the United States. Israel has recognized the 
importance of lobbies and interest groups from an early point on, and has spent 
considerable funding into studying the U.S. political system. Janice Terry notes that: 
“Unlike the Arab states, from 1948 onward, Israel has supported institutes such as 
the Jaffee Center10°”. Israeli academic experts routinely advise Israeli prime 
ministers, while centers for strategic studies based in Israeli universities keep the 
Israeli government informed on the ebb and flow of domestic policies in the U.S. as 
well as on matters pertaining to the Middle East101.” In addition, the Israeli embassy
99 IBID, pg. 66
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and various other Jewish American organizations assure the steady flow of 
information exchange between Israeli and the United States.
There is one interesting observation to be made about Jewish Americans and 
their lobby efforts, an issue which to some degree stands in contrast, but does not 
affect the work of lobby groups. What I am referring to, is that many American Jews 
feel emotionally sympathetic to Israel, but do not share the hard-line Likud party 
approach towards questions involving Palestine or the Occupied Territories. In 
addition many American Jews (also most Israelis) are not extreme Orthodox, rather 
moderates. Two thirds of Jewish Americans for example say that they are 
emotionally attached as just mentioned, but that only about thirty-five percent have 
visited the country. Despite the sometimes strong acts of violence in the Israeli- 
Palestinian/Arab conflict, which lead to the confusion and alienation of many 
American Jews towards their perception of Israel (Thomas Friedman noted this 
phenomena concerning the Sabra and Shatila massacre in his book From Beirut to 
Jerusalem), many remain loyal supporters. As Thomas Friedman notes: “Israel in the 
mind o f American Jews always touched two emotional chords -  one pride, the other 
fear. As such, Israel has traditionally played two roles for American Jews -  one as a 
visible symbol which places the Jew in the world and integrates him with dignity, and 
the other as a haven that could protect the Jew from a world turned hostile. 102” 
Despite the existence of numerous pro-Israeli lobby groups and think thanks in the 
United States (among others the Conference of American Rabbis, Hadassah, the 
American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation 
League [ADL], American Enterprise Institute [AEI], the Middle East Media 
Research Institute [Memri] and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
[WINEP]) I would like to focus my attention to one specific group which deserves 
the most attention, AIPAC.
The synonym for successful Jewish American lobby efforts - and 
unquestionably one of the major political players in Washington - is AIPAC, the 
American Israel Public Affairs Committee. “ With its proven ability to deliver votes 
and channel money to candidates and punish its enemies, AIPAC is a ‘star’ 
performer... using AIPAC and pro-Israeli think tanks have formed an alliance with 
both the Christian right and the neo-conservatives and have what is commonly
102 Friedman, Thomas. From Beirut to Jerusalem. New York: Anchor Books. 1990, pg. 454
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considered the inside track in the White House...AIPAC’s collective mobilizing 
ability is unsurpassed in terms o f the quality and quantity ofpolitical communication 
that can be triggered on specific perceived to be critical o f Israel. ”103 AIP AC, a 
registered lobby in Washington, evolved out of the American Zionist Council and 
was founded in 1954 by I.L. Kenen. Kenen’s interpretation of AIPAC’s role was to 
“tell the president to overrule the State Department.”104 The role of AIP AC has also 
to be seen as a sort of clearing house for other pro-Israeli lobby groups, coordinating 
and bundling the efforts of all (an organizational structure that for example is totally 
lacking from the incoherent pro-Arab lobby groups). “In the 1990’s, AIP AC was 
considered the second most effective lobby in the country, ranking only behind the 
American Association o f Retired Persons; thereby exceeding the power and clout o f 
even organized labor.”105 To get an idea of the current issues AIP AC focuses on, one 
can simply refer to their webpage, it states that “AIPAC has worked with Congress 
and the Executive Branch on numerous critical initiatives, including106”:
■ Reiterating standards for the Palestinian government through letters signed by 
259 House members and 79 senators urging the EU and United States not to 
provide aid or grant recognition to any Palestinian government until it fulfills 
internationally backed requirements.
■ Securing critical foreign aid to Israel, which totaled $2.52 billion in 2006 and 
will provide military and economic assistance.
■ Prohibiting U.S. aid and contacts with the Hamas-led PA until its leaders 
recognize Israel's right to exist, renounce violence and ratify previous Israeli- 
Palestinian peace agreements.
■ Extending U.S.-backed loan guarantees to Israel until 2011 and renewing the 
authority to transfer U.S. military equipment to be stored in Israel for use in a 
potential crisis.
■ Increasing military aid to Israel by working for $1 billion in government 
grants that will help cover the escalating costs of the war on terrorism.
103 IBID, pg. 74
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This short list clearly indicates the commitment with which AIPAC tries to 
alter foreign policy decisions in favor of Israel. The final two features of the scope of 
work of pro-Israel lobby groups that I would like to touch upon are PACs and means 
to raise congressional support as well as financial aid.
PACs are political action committees which give money to usually both parties 
(Democratic and Republican), usually however more to the one in power. In the 
United States PACs function in the way that they help in either electing or defeating 
government officials, or to promote legislation. In the 1980’s, election laws restricted 
the spending on presidential campaigns, but the House and Senate remained privately 
funded with no spending limits. In the mid 1980’s for example, Janice Terry writes 
that pro-Israeli PACs had financial contributions of $3.8 million, while from 1990 to
2004 pro-Israeli PACs gave an estimated $41.3 to federal candidates and political 
parties. By 2003 there were about 100 of such pro-Israeli PACs. “The success o f pro- 
Israeli PACs is a sensitive issue for Zionist supporters as well as politicians. I f  the 
American public were to perceive PACs as exercising undue influence on the 
legislative process, a backlash against all PACs could result. Consequently AIPAC 
has recommended using their influence ‘with measured discretion or risk incurring 
negative fallout. In particular AIPAC does not want to imperil the flow o f foreign
107and military aid for Israel that Congressional support had hitherto ensured 
PACs are thus another useful tool in the work of lobby groups.
The final and perhaps one of the most important tasks of pro-Israeli lobby 
groups is to raise congressional support as well as financial aid for Israel. What is 
important to note, is that since the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign military and 
economic assistance has declined but aid to Israel has continued to rise; an outcome 
also due to the successful work of lobby groups. During the 1990s U.S. aid to Israel 
was at least $3 billion per year, $1.2 billion in economic aid and $1.8 billion in 
military aid quotes Janice Terry. This was more than the amount for all of sub- 
Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. Thus to conclude the illustration 
of the successful work of pro-Israeli lobby groups, I would like to quote Janice Terry 
one last time. She stated that: “As a direct result of Congressional support, U.S. aid 
to Israel from 1948 to 2001 totaled over $91 billion and by 2003 the total U.S.
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financial aid, including special advantages/indirect costs, was estimated to be as high 
as $1.8 trillion... In large measure owing to the successes of pro-Israeli lobby forces, 
Israel has been the single largest recipient of U.S. aid since World War II.”108
In my effort to explain the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict, I have come all the 
way from the origins of the state of Israel; the emergence of the PLO and later 
Hamas; and how media and lobby groups have an influence on the political decision 
making. I would now like to discuss and explore potential peace proposals.
108 IBID, pg. 81
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9 - PE A C E  PROPSALS A N D  E C O N O M IC  IN C E N T IV E S
Identifying the requirements for success in implementing a peace process in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict are important steps towards a Palestinian state. 
Throughout the conflict, different proposals have been made towards a peace 
process, many of which have been mentioned already. Despite the continuing 
violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a majority of Palestinians and Israelis 
want nothing more than peace, and are simply weary of the ever ongoing violence. 
The Roadmap initiative which is officially supported by the United States, the 
European Union, Russia, the United Nations as well as the Palestinians and Israelis 
had already called for the establishment of a Palestinian state in 2005. President Bush 
has recently revised the timeframe of this undertaking and pushed it back to 2009. 
Regardless of the uncertainties of this being a realist date, the importance of having a 
concrete and realistic plan is vital. In this regard it is important to consider the 
particularities of the Middle East; even though the Palestinians are a much more 
coherent people, not implementing the right kind of institutions to provide security, 
employment and a general vision can result in to a similar scenario as in Iraq. 
Regardless of the successful implementation of a peace process, we must consider 
that the same people will live next to each, thus much focus has to be spend on 
finding measures to build trust amongst Israelis and Palestinians.
To achieve success, a potential Palestinian state must be able to provide many 
of the fundamental features which I have referred to in chapter seven (those of a 
social contract). In Helping a Palestinian State Succeed, the Rand Corporation 
defines the four fundamental challenges to success as109:
■ “Security: A Palestinian state must improve the level o f security for 
Palestinians, Israelis, and the region.”
■ “Governance: A Palestinian state must govern effectively and be viewed as 
legitimate by both its citizens and the international community.'1'’
■ “Economic development: Palestine must be economically viable and, over 
time self reliant.'”
109 Rand Organization. Helping a Palestinian State Succeed. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. 2005, pg. 4
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■ “Well being o f its people: Palestine must be capable o f feeding, clothing, 
educating, and providing for the health and social well-being o f its people.”
It would require an actual thesis to discuss the various peace proposals which 
have been offered and posed by the various sides involved in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Amongst the most important ones were:
■ The 1967 UN resolution 242
■ The 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles
■ The 1998 Wye River Plantation Talks
■ The 2000 Camp David Summit
■ The 2001 Taba Summit
■ The 2002 Saudi Peace Initiative
■ The 2002 Road Map to Peace
These proposals serve as a good base, but they only have an effect if the parties 
truly abide to the suggested implications. “The War Against Terror is connected with 
the War on Poverty” Former Secretary of State Colin Powell was right with this 
assessment. The main issue of Palestinians is that they do not have an independent 
state in which they can peacefully live in. In addition, their harsh economic situation 
is driving many to the extremists. When I asked one of my closets’ friends who had 
served in the British army in Basra/Iraq of what he thought of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and his personal assessment of the situation in Iraq, he simply said: 
“Desperate people will do desperate things”. It is a very dry answer, yet it explains 
many of the issues happening still today.
What has to be remembered, when considering the massive amounts of 
funding that seems to be available, is that a conviction has to be reached that more 
money can be made from a peace between Israelis and Palestinians than from 
conflict and continuing acts of war. Perhaps it is this essential strategy that could 
ultimately lead to an end of the conflict. Dr. Lucie Hindlsova of the Czech Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs suggested that “the first steps have to be made by giving small 
concessions to both sides”110. Israelis need to see serious efforts in the increase of 
their domestic security, being able to envision that their citizens are able to move free
110 Interview with Dr. Lucie Hindlsova, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs May 9th 2007
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and without fear. The Palestinians need to have a vision that they will be able to 
attain an independent state. Small steps to success can be achieved by riding tedious 
procedures at boarder crossings, free movement of goods or freeing the tax income 
held back by Israel which is owed to the Palestinian Authority. “Only when primary 
care in infrastructure and human capital is provided, markets are driving forces in 
development. Without these preconditions markets can turn in a state o f permanent 
poverty. Collective actions, through the creation o f the aforementioned factors can 
lead to economic success.”111 Jeffrey Sachs only reaffirms the overriding argument 
of this thesis, that economics and politics are closely interlinked, especially in the 
Middle East. Only by allowing small steps towards economic improvement can real 
political stability be achieved.
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1 0 -CO N CLU SIO N
In this thesis I have tried to shed light on the most prevalent features of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These factors are often times underestimated, and through 
my personal experience by living in the Middle East, I have given an explanation as 
to why they need to be considered. I have first familiarized the reader with an 
understanding of the modem Middle East, roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
which date back hundreds, if we want to thousands of years ago. In explaining the 
short comings of decisions made by outside forces, I showed how hostility and a 
feeling of betrayal grew not only amongst Palestiñians, but also Middle Easterners at 
large.
I have then defined the terminology of what a state is, if the PLO ever fell into 
this category and from providing this insight I was able to explain to the reader what 
the Palestinians are lacking if they are to succeed with an independent state. Because 
of such shortcomings I have also explained what can happen when no formal 
institutions exist, and how a so-called shadow economy is able to take over the role 
of an actual state. This phenomenon was further illustrated in explaining elementary 
needs of human beings in connection with the rise of the fundamental Hamas.
The final part of my thesis included the role of media and lobby groups in the 
formation of perceptions and policy making. It may be seen as one of the most 
important factors in influencing the outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Misinterpretations and clichés need to be avoided in keeping things in perspective. 
The media is having its fair share of responsibility in the increased hostility towards 
the Middle East, a topic which was thoroughly discussed. ‘Wo Peace without Justice, 
no Justice without Peace”. Peace is always better than war argues Noam Chomsky, 
but peace is not an absolute measure. “ We must always ask what kind o f peace we 
are dealing with. I f  Hitler would have conquered the world, his dictated peace would 
not have been the kind which we would preferm ”. A just peace has to be found in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a peace that benefits both sides and enables both Israelis 
and Palestinians to live in peace and prosperity.
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“For me, the land, the stones, are what will create the redemptive quality for 
this society, ’ says Hartmann. ‘The important thing is what kind o f human love and 
kind o f daily life I  live. Gush Emunim believe that i f  they redeem the land then God 
will redeem the people. My view is that you have to redeem the people, period. 
Where the redemption o f the people will lead I  don’t know, but it can’t be bad. I  
believe tomorrow will be better than today i f  today I  treat my barber and my grocer 
and my taxi driver better, not because I  sit on a hill in Hebron. I  believe tomorrow 
will be better than today i f  I  expand ethics, expand morality, expand coexistence 
among people o f diverse cultures, expand quality o f life -  but not by expanding 
boundaries. I  can’t bring the Messiah by abusing 2 million Palestinian Arabs today. 
I  can’t say that what I  am doing now is going to bring universal redemption. That is 
what Stalin said, so he killed 20 million people. All people who think they are 
redeeming the world don’t see the evil that they are doing every day. I f  your eyes are 
on eternity you can be blind to the person sitting next to you. ‘Remember, ’ concluded 
Hartmann, 'the holiness o f the people precedes the holiness o f the land. There is no 
mystical significance to land. There is only a significance to what human beings do. 
Holiness in Judaism does not come from stones or books. It comes from you and me 
and how we live here and now.113”
It was also the aim of this thesis to mainly keep cool heads and warm hearts in 
analyzing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I know from personal experience how 
much the different culture of the Middle East can have a confusing effect on people 
alien to the region. The region is close to me, and I will always come back to it. 
Knowing both sides, having Arab and Jewish friends is a particular factor which 
always reassures me that peace in the Middle East is possible. Martin Luther King 
used to say, “Jesus said, love your enemies. Why, love your enemy? Because i f  you 
love your enemy, your might come to know your enemy. Your enemy might come to 
know you and i f  you know your enemy and understand your enemy, you might 
understand why your enemy is your enemy, and you might also understand what you 
might have done to make your enemy your enemy and then you can change that.” If 
this thesis was meant to achieve anything at all, then to provide the reader with an 
understanding of what some of the driving forces are in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.
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Source: Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 
November 22,1967
Following the June '67, Six-Day War, the situation in the Middle East was 
discussed by the UN General Assembly, which referred the issue to the 
Security Council. After lengthy discussion, a final draft for a Security 
Council resolution was presented by the British Ambassador, Lord 
Caradon, on November 22, 1967. It was adopted on the same day.
This resolution, numbered 242, established provisions and principles 
which, it was hoped, would lead to a solution o f the conflict. Resolution 242 
was to become the cornerstone o f Middle East diplomatic efforts in the 
coming decades.
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need 
to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in 
security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of 
the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with 
Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment 
of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the 
application of both the following principles:
o Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 
recent conflict;
o Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for 
and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every State in the area and their right to 
live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from 
threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
o For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international 
waterways in the area;
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o For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
o For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political
independence of every State in the area, through measures including 
the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to 
proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the 
States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve 
a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and 
principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the 
progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible
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Annex B
Source: Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs
U.N. Security Council Resolution 338
October 22,1973
In the later stages o f the Yom Kippur War — after Israel repulsed the Syrian 
attack on the Golan Heights and established a bridgehead on the Egyptian 
side o f  the Suez Canal — international efforts to stop the fighting were 
intensified. US Secretary o f State Kissinger flew to Moscow on October 20, 
and, together with the Soviet Government, the US proposed a cease-fire 
resolution in the UN Security Council. The Council met on 21 October at 
the urgent request o f both the US and the USSR, and by 14 votes to none, 
adopted the following resolution:
The Security Council,
1. Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all 
military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the 
adoption of this decision, in the positions after the moment of the adoption 
of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the 
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its 
parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations 
start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at 
establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
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Annex C
Source: Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs
Camp David Accords
September 17,1978
After twelve days o f secret negotiations at Camp David, the Israeli- 
Egyptian negotiations were concluded by the signing at the White House o f 
two agreements. The first dealt with the future o f the Sinai and peace 
between Israel and Egypt, to be concluded within three months. The second 
was a framework agreement establishing a format for the conduct o f 
negotiations for the establishment o f an autonomy regime in the West Bank 
and Gaza. The Israel-Egypt agreement clearly defined the future relations 
between the two countries, all aspects ofwithdrawal from the Sinai, 
military arrangements in the peninsula such as demilitarization and 
limitations, as well as the supervision mechanism. The framework 
agreement regarding the future o f Judea, Samaria and Gaza was less clear 
and was later interpreted differently by Israel, Egypt, and the US. President 
Carter witnessed the accords which were signed by Egyptian President 
Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin.
THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS
The Framework for Peace in the Middle East
Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and 
Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of 
the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 
1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. 
They invite other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.
Preamble
The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:
• The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and 
its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its 
parts.
• After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle 
East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great 
religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle 
East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the 
region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can 
become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.
• The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the 
reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of 
Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the
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peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of 
these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an 
unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this 
generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.
• The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted 
norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards 
for the conduct of relations among all states.
• To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United 
Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor 
prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the 
purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 
and 338.
• Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace 
within secure and recognized boundaries.free from threats or acts of force. 
Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of 
reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting 
economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security.
• Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between 
nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace 
treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security 
arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early 
warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed 
measures for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are useful.
Framework
Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, 
comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the 
conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in 
all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. 
They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been 
most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as 
appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between 
Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is 
prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, 
they have agreed to proceed as follows:
A. West Bank and Gaza
1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people 
should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian 
problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to 
the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:
a. Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly 
transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns 
of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the 
West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order 
to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these
87
arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian 
administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing 
authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to 
replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of 
a transitional arrangement, Jordan will be invited to join the 
negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new 
arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of 
self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the 
legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.
b. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for 
establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and 
Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians 
from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually 
agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define 
the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be 
exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed 
forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the 
remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The 
agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and 
external security and public order. A strong local police force will 
be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, 
Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in 
the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.
c. When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the 
West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional 
period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later 
than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, 
negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West 
Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to 
conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the 
transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the 
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related 
committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of 
representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on 
the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with 
its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of 
representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined 
by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank 
and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, 
taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the 
West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the 
provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. 
The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of 
the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The 
solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate 
right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements. In this 
way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their 
own future through:
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i. The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the 
representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza 
to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and 
other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
ii. Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected 
representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and 
Gaza.
iii. Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of 
the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern 
themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.
iv. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee 
negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.
d. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure 
the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period 
and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local 
police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It 
will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The 
police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the 
designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.
e. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing 
committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of 
persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together 
with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other 
matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this 
committee.
f. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested 
parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and 
permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.
B. Egypt-Israel
1. Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle 
disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.
2. n order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in 
good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing 
of the Framework a peace treaty between them while inviting the other 
parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude 
similar peace treaties with a view the achieving a comprehensive peace in 
the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between 
Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The 
parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the 
implementation of their obligations under the treaty.
C. Associated Principles
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1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below 
should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors - 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states 
at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all 
the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include:
a. full recognition;
b. abolishing economic boycotts;
c. guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other 
parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.
3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the 
context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the 
atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common 
goal.
4. Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all 
financial claims.
5. The United States shall be invited to participated in the talks on matters 
related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and 
working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the 
parties.
6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the 
peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The 
permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to 
underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect or the provisions. They 
shall be requested to conform their policies an actions with the undertaking 
contained in this Framework.
For the Government of Israel:
Menachem Begin
For the Government of 




President of the United States of America
Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty 
between Egypt and Israel
In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in 
good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this 
framework a peace treaty between them:
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• The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location 
or locations to be mutually agreed.
• All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of 
the dispute between Israel and Egypt.
• Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be 
implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.
The following matters are agreed between the parties:
1. the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally 
recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
2. the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;
3. the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, 
and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible 
commercial use only by all nations;
4. the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the 
Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying 
to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international 
waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable 
freedom of navigation and overflight;
5. the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with 
guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and
6. the stationing of military forces listed below.
Stationing of Forces
No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will 
be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 km. (30 miles) east of the Gulf 
of Suez and the Suez Canal.
Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to 
perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the 
international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. (12 
miles) to 40 km. (24 miles).
In the area within 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of the international border there will be 
Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United 
Nations observers.
Border patrol units not to exceed three battalions will supplement the civil police in 
maintaining order in the area not included above.
The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace 
negotiations.
Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the 
agreement.
It is agreed that:
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United Nations forces will be stationed:
1. in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the 
Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and
2. in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait 
of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is 
approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous 
vote of the five permanent members.
After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal 
relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, 
including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic 
boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual 
protection of citizens by the due process of law.
Interim Withdrawal
Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all 
Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to 
Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual 
agreement.
For the Government of 
the Arab Republic of Egypt:
Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat




President of the United States of America
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Annex D
Source: The Observer (The Guardian)
O f Doves and Hawks
T H E  D O V E S  S A Y:
But Europe and most of the Islamic world do not agree and you risk alienating 
Muslims all over the world.
T H E  H A W K S  S A Y:
There is a clear and present danger to the West and Muslim anger is a price worth 
paying to eradicate it. Anyway most governments will come on board.
T H E  D O V E S  S A Y :
But you risk destabilising the entire Middle East and will hand a massive propaganda 
victory to extremists everywhere. On top of that you could get involved in a long, 
vicious and nasty war in which thousands of civilians and soldiers will die, it will 
seriously damage our economies, it will be hugely expensive, no one has any idea of 
what will happen afterwards and, even in the best case scenario, we will have to have 
peace-keeping troops stuck there for years.
T H E  H A W K S  S A Y:
There are always whingers and doom-mongerers. Sometimes decisive and brave 
action is called for. This is an opportunity to change the whole shape of Middle 
Eastern politics for the better. We take out Saddam, put in a new pro-Western 
government, get its oil on line, cut down our strategic dependency on Saudis Arabia 
and other unpleasant regimes. And if we do not do it now we will have to do it when 
Saddam has got a nuclear bomb. You make the call.
T H E  D O V E S  S A Y :
But we have done all right with our containment policy for the past 10 years. There is 
no proven link to any terrorist act outside his country. Why change now when there 
is no link between Saddam and 11 September.
THE HAWKS SAY:




Saddam has or will soon have nuclear, biological and chemical weapons
THE DOVES SAY:
The only evidence we have seen of this is from American intelligence. Why not let 
the inspectors back in and let them find out?
THE HAWKS SAY:
That is just what Saddam wants us to do, delaying him to build support in the Arab 
world. We need a regime change to solve this problem once and for all.
THE DOVES SAY:
But you cannot just go around invading countries you do not like. There is no UN 
mandate. It is illegal.
THE HAWKS SAY:
Saddam is in flagrant violation of the 1991 ceasefire that was under the authority of 
the UN. That is enough. Anyway, no one was particularly bothered by the legality of 
attacking Afghanistan and if we had listened to the lawyers in Kosovo it would have 
been a disaster.
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